

FREE
THOUGHTS
CONCERNING
SOULS:

In Four Essays:

- I. Of the Humane Soul consider'd in its own Nature.
- II. Of the Humane Soul compared with the Souls of Brutes.
- III. Of the supposed Præ-existent State of Souls.
- IV. Of the Future States of Souls.

To which is added,
AN ESSAY ON CREATION.

By the AUTHOR of *the Impartial Inquiry, &c.*

Quòd si in hoc erro, quòd Animos Hominum immortales esse credam; libentèr erro: Nec mihi hunc Errorem, quò delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo: Sin Mortuus (ut quidam *Minuti Philosophi* censent) nihil sentiam; non vereor, nè hunc Errorem meum mortui Philosophi irrideant. *Cicero.*


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THE

PREFACE.



MODEST Freedom of Enquiry cannot be condemned by any Good Man, or True Protestant. For as the Field of Knowledge is naturally common for every Man, so 'tis owing to the Reformation that all unnatural Inclosures have been broken down and removed.

A 2

IF

IF an Enquiry into the Structure of the Bodies of the meanest Insects may be deem'd worthy the Attention of the Gravest Philosophers, the Study of the Nature of Souls must certainly be an Employment as much more worthy as the Subject is both more Noble and of greater Importance. But tho' the Anatomy of Bodies (both simple and comparative) hath been well studied and improved of late Years, yet the Anatomy (if I may so speak) of Souls, especially that which is Comparative, hath been less regarded; and when attempted, the Success has been less remarkable.

AS to what concerns the Success of the following Essays, it must be left to the Judgment of Others: But it may be expected that I should give some Account of the Nature of the Performance.

THE Method I follow is what is call'd the Analytical; which as it is the only Method of discovering Truth, so if well attended to, it is the fittest to communicate it to others. For by this Method

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thod the Readers are, as it were, led by the Hand, and acquainted with every Step that is taken from the Beginning to the End of the Pursuit.

WHEN Both the opposite Ways seem too much beset with Difficulties, I endeavour to search out a Middle Way. For tho' Men are generally inclined to Extremes, both in Principles and Practice, yet I cannot help thinking not only that the Middle Way is the Way of Virtue, but likewise that it is commonly the Way of Truth.

NEXT to Error itself, I study to avoid Dogmatizing, or deciding too positively concerning Matters not clearly proved.

TO the Essays concerning Souls I have added another on Creation; partly because Creation is frequently mention'd in those Essays, and partly because some former Essays have furnish'd certain Hints not impertinent to that Subject.


THE

The PREFACE.

THE Whole is dedicated to Religion and Virtue, and offer'd to the Consideration of the Curious and Impartial by

Their Humble Servant,

S. COLLIBER.



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ERRATA

Page 52. l. 14. for *Internal* read *Internal Sensation*.
p. 53. l. 26. l. 27. usually found. p. 130. l. 1. ult. dele *we*;
p. 157. l. 1. 20. much ought to begin a Sentence.

Eliza V.

SECTION I
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Constitution

SECTION IV
The Rights and Obligations of a Person
State according to the provisions of the
Constitution



Free Thoughts
CONCERNING
SOULS.

The First Essay.

*Of the Humane Soul considered in its
own Nature.*

SECT. I.



Y the Word $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ or *Soul*, ESSAY
the Ancient *Greeks* meant I.
any Internal Vital Prin-
ciple, either of Growth,
Sense or Action. This
gave Occasion to *Aristotle* to speak of
Three distinct Souls in Man: *Viz.* a
Vegetative, a Sensitive and a Ratio-
nal Soul; the first a Principle of
Growth, the second of Sense, and
the third of Intellectual Action.

B

That

ESSAY

I. That there is a Vital Principle of Growth in Man, which some still call by the Name of a *Vegetative Soul*, and which may be compared with the Principle of Vegetation or Growth in Plants, is allow'd on all Hands. 'Tis likewise generally allowed, that this Vegetative Principle, called a Soul, is neither Rational nor Sensitive, and that it is no other than the more refined and spirituous Particles of the Body itself (commonly known by the Name of *Vital Spirits*) which carry on the Circulation of the Blood, on which the Life and Growth of our Bodies immediately depend, as do the Life and Growth of Plants on the Motion of the Sap.

But *Aristotle* seems to have been the first who ever dreamt that the *Sensitive* Soul in Man was distinct from the Rational.

To shew that this Distinction between the Sensitive and the Rational Soul in Man is without Foundation, it might be sufficient to observe, that we are conscious but of One Perceptive Principle within us: But if we desire a further Proof, it will be necessary to consider our various Manners of Thinking, together with the Faculties or Powers from which they proceed:

proceed: Which will not only de-
 termine this Affair, but serve as a fit
 Introduction to the following Essays. ESSAY I.

By *Thinking* or *Thought* (in a large
 Sense) I understand *Any Internal Act*,
of which we are immediately Conscious,
with Regard to Objects.

If we reflect, we may observe in
 our selves Two principal Modes or
 Manners of Thinking, each of which
 is capable of its particular Modes and
 Differences. The first is Sensation or
 Perception (which is Thinking in the
 strict Sense) The second is Volition
 or Willing.

Sensation is either Simple or Com-
 parative.

1. Simple, or Single Sensation, is,
 either the Perception of our own
 Existence, or of any Internal Action
 or Passion (which Perception renders
 us, as it were, the Objects of our
 own Thought, by a sort of Reflection)
 or else it is our Perception of any
 Impression or Idea (or Notion) derived
 from external Objects. In both these
 Sorts of Simple Sensation (*viz.* External
 and Internal) our Action is *Attention*
 either to a single Impression or Idea:
 Which Action is like turning and fix-
 ing the Eye on a single Object.

ESSAY

2. Comparative or Compound Sensation, is, the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of divers Ideas, arising from Comparison. Under Comparative Sensation are comprehended *Intuition* and *Reasoning*: The first of which is our Attention to the Agreement or Disagreement of Two Ideas; the second is our Attention to the Agreement or Disagreement of Three or More; as will be shewn.

All these various Sorts of Sensation may very well proceed from one and the same *Sensitive* or Perceptive Faculty, according as it variously fixes our Attention either on One or More Impressions or Ideas.

The other principal Mode or Manner of Thinking is *Volition* or *Willing*, proceeding from the *Volitive* Faculty; which shall be treated of in the proper Place.

There is yet a Third Faculty or Power of the Human Soul, viz. the *Executive*. But this some confound with the Will or Volitive Faculty; notwithstanding that their Notions are as different as those of Commanding and Obeying.

From these Remarks it appears, That *Reasoning* (which is the Noblest Degree


Degree of *Thought* in Us) is it self ESSAY
 but a more Perfect Degree of *Sensation* or Perception; and likewise that 1.
 even *External Sensation* (which is the
 Lowest Degree of Sensation or Per-
 ception) is no less than Thought, tho'
 it includes a less Perfect Act of At-
 tention.

But if Reasoning, or the Noblest
 Degree of Thought in Us, is but a
 more Perfect Degree of *Sensation*, and
 if even *External Sensation*, which is
 the lowest Degree of Sensation, is
Thought, we ought to conclude, that
 where External Sensation is found to-
 gether with Reasoning (as in Man) they
 Both proceed from the same Think-
 ing Principle, and consequently, that
 the very same Thinking Principle (or
 Soul) is both Sensitive and *Rational*:
 For as one Thinking Perceptive Prin-
 ciple is sufficient for Both, 'tis un-
 reasonable to suppose More than One.

S E C T. II.

But what is this Thinking Prin-
 ciple which is properly called the
 Human Soul? Is it only a single
 Particle, or is it a Composition,
 or the Result of a Composition, of
 the more refined Particles of the Bo-
 dy? Or else is it Something Essenti-
 ally

ESSAY ally Distinct from and Independent of
I. the Body.



These are Queries that have long exercised the Free Thoughts of the Curious. And as the Scriptures decide nothing about them, but leave them (as they do other Points of Philosophy) to the Discussion of Reason, the same Freedom of Thinking must be allowed to be still the Right of every Man?

Nor have past Enquiries struck such a Light as may be pretended to render all farther Enquiries unnecessary. For the Antients (particularly the *Chaldeans* and *Egyptians*) from whom the *Greeks* received the Doctrine of the Natural Immortality of the Human Soul and its Essential Distinction from the Body, seem to have done little in the way of Reasoning. Their chief Care was (not to improve but) only to preserve certain Traditional Unproved Opinions, and to hand them down to Posterity. And even when the Philosophers of *Greece* began to reason upon the mentioned Doctrine after their free manner, and to enquire into the Nature and Substance of the Soul, the Variety of their Opinions, and the Loudness of their Disputes proclaim'd their

their little Success. Some doubted Essay
 of its Immortality, and some as stiff- I.
 ly denied as others zealously defended
 it. The *Epicureans* and *Democriticks*
 held that it would be dissolved, and
 reduced to insensible Atoms at Death.
 The *Stoicks* contended that it would,
 at last, lose its Individuation, and re-
 turn into the Common Soul of the
 World, of which it was a Part. And
 the *Pyrrhonists* (unsettled by these and
 other Disputes) profess'd themselves
 to doubt not only of its Immortality,
 but of every thing else. The Case con-
 tinues much the same, and we have
 still our *Epicureans*, *Stoicks* and *Pyrr-
 honists*, tho' under other Names.

S E C T. III.

But without amusing ourselves
 with the Opinions of others, let us
 attend to the Dictates of Reason,
 grounded on our own Experience and
 Observation.

If we consult our Experience, we
 shall, as was said, observe in ourselves
 divers Sorts and Degrees of Thinking
 or Thought. Whoever therefore un-
 dertakes to prove that the Thinking
 Principle within us is Something Es-
 sentially distinct from the Humane Bo-
 dy, may do well to enquire, in the
 first

ESSAY first place, whether the Body is con-

I. cern'd in any sort or degree of Thinking.

That the Brain is the Seat of Sensation (which we have observ'd to be one sort of Thinking) is at present universally agreed. Sensation seems indeed to be diffused throughout all Parts of the Body : But it has been demonstrated by Learned Anatomists to be no where, in reality, but in the Brain ; to which the Sensible Impressions made either on the External or Internal Parts of the Body, are as it were convey'd by means of the Nerves : For where there is no Nerve there is no Sensation of Impressions from Objects.

The Seat of the Humane Soul or that Thinking Principle within us (whatever it is) must therefore be in that Part of the Brain where the Nerves from all Parts of the Body meet as in their Common Center ; which Part is usually call'd the *Common Sensorie*, and is observ'd by Dr. Willis to be near the beginning of the *Medulla Oblongata* in the *Corpus Striatum*.

That the Cavities or hollow Spaces of this Part of the Brain abound with plenty of the finest and most volatile Spirits

Spirits which are separated by means of certain Vessels from the Blood, and which, tho' call'd Spirits, are really parts of the Body, not unlike the purest Invisible Spirits of Wine, and consisting like these Spirits, of a Swarm of innumerable loose Particles, or very small Parts, is most certain. This is clearly proved from the Dizziness we sometimes feel, when every thing about us seems to turn round; which can proceed from nothing else, but the whirling Motion of the mention'd Spirits. 'Tis likewise proved from the Heat we are sensible of while our Thoughts are busily employ'd, and from the Faintness which follows long and intense Thinking; both which must be concluded to proceed from the violent Agitation and Expence of these Spirits.

From these Observations 'tis evident, that if any Part or Particle of the Body is qualified to be the Soul or Principle of Thinking, it must have its Seat among these Spirits of the Brain (which are commonly call'd *Animal Spirits*) for as much as they are certainly concern'd in Thinking. 'Tis likewise clear from Reason, that if the Thinking Principle within us is not a Being Essentially distinct from

ESSAY our Bodies, it must be either a single
I. Particle in the Brain, or else it must be
a Composition or the Result of a Com-
position of divers Particles : Mean-
ing by Particles those Original least
Parts of which Bodies are compos'd,
and to which they may be reduc'd by
Natural Means.

That the Humane Soul, or the
Thinking Principle within us, is not
a single Particle in the Brain, may,
it's conceiv'd, be clearly inferr'd from
the Incapacity of a single Particle to
receive at once so great Variety of
Sensations as is receiv'd by the Hu-
mane Soul. For as the Thinking Prin-
ciple within us, (if a single Particle)
cannot receive Sensations immediately
from the Objects of Sense, 'tis clear that
it can receive them no otherwise than
by means of Impressions from some
Particles of the Spirits of the Brain
acting upon it; the Numbers of which
Particles must, by Consequence, bear
some Proportion to the vast Variety
of Objects that are at once perceiv'd.
But if all the single Particles of which
Bodies consist are either of Equal or
nearly Equal Bulk, 'tis impossible any
one of them should at once receive
such Variety of Sensations from the
Impressions of the other Particles.

But

But how doth it appear, that the single Particles of which Bodies consist are either Equal or nearly Equal in Bulk? This Query will, it's conceived, be fully satisfied by the following Remarks:

ESSAY
I.

1. No Corporealist, at least, has a Right to suppose any Inequality of Bulk among the single Particles of Bodies. For since he supposes them to be Eternal, and by Consequence, equally necessary with respect to Existence or Being, he ought likewise to suppose them Equal in all other respects: For as much as being of the same Nature, an equal Necessity of Existence could not be the Foundation of any Inequality among them, but quite the Reverse.

2. No Man whatsoever has the least Ground to suppose any Inequality of Bulk among the single Particles of which Bodies consist; for there is nothing in Nature to found such a Supposition upon. We see that even the grossest parts of Bodies are reducible to very minute parts, which parts are found to consist of a prodigious Variety of Parts much more Minute, which yet cannot be said to be the Single or Original Particles of which they consist. For no Microscope, tho' it

ESSAY might magnify to an hundred thou-

I. sand times and more, could ever yet
~~~~~ certainly discover to the acutest Eye  
the proper Bulk and Figure of any  
two of the Single Particles: Much  
less could it discover any Inequality  
between them.

3. 'Tis very unphilosophical to suppose any Inequality of Bulk or Difference of Figure among the single Particles of Bodies; because it is a Supposition both Unnecessary, and contrary to Experience? 'Tis Unnecessary; because all the Sensible Appearances, and Mechanical Operations of Nature may as conveniently be accounted for on Supposition of the strict Union and various Configuration of Equal Particles, as on Supposition of Particles originally Unequal or of various Figures. 'Tis likewise contrary to Experience. For the Instruments of Nature's Operations are always the most simple: Yet out of Simplicity She produces an almost Infinite Variety. Accordingly the First Principles (or Original Particles) of Bodies, take all Sorts of Forms from Composition, and all Forms are varied by their Separation. So that the Equality of the single or original Particles appears both from their equal Fitness for the  
Purposes

Purposes of Nature, and likewise **ESSAY**  
 from our Experience of the constant **I.**  
 Simplicity of the Instruments of Nature's Operations. ~~~~~

But if the single Particles of Bodies are to be supposed of equal Bulk, then no single Particle (tho' capable of Sensation) may be supposed to receive any more than one full sensible Impression on a Side at once. But that one Impression, being likewise made by a single Particle, cannot excite any Variety of Sensations in the other Particle.

To make this plain by an Instance exactly parallel. Our Eyes are capable of receiving Impressions from a vast Number of Objects at once by means of the Rays of Light, because the single Particles which compose the Rays are inconceivably smaller than the Pupils of the Eyes through which they are receiv'd. But supposing each single Particle of the Rays to be of equal Bulk with each of the Pupils, 'tis certain that neither of the Pupils could then receive more than one full or total Impression at a time; which could produce no Variety of Sensation of Visible Objects.

Thus the Case would be in all Sensations of the Soul, if it were a single Particle, even supposing the Sensible Impressions



Essay Impressions to be always made by single Particles. But as the Original

Particles are so extremely minute, and so apt to adhere to each other, that it may be doubted whether any two of them exist singly or separately in the Universe, as likewise whether the most refined Particles of the Animal Spirits, by which the Impressions must be conceiv'd to be made, are not Concretions or Compositions of many smaller Particles; this at least cannot but render the Impossibility of so great a Variety of Sensations (if the Soul be a single Particle of Matter) as manifest as that a thing cannot be Equal to the Whole of which it may be consider'd as a Part.

But supposing on the contrary, that there is some Inequality among the Original Particles of Bodies; supposing likewise that the more bulky Particles are sufficiently capable of Sensations; Volition and Self-motion, and that those of less Bulk are only qualified to be the Instruments of their Sensations and Operations; What real Advantage would these Suppositions yield to the Cause of Irreligion? Would not the more bulky Particles be, in all Essential Points, the same with what we are used to call Spiritual Souls? And might

might not all the Inferences be drawn from thence that can, with Reason, be drawn from the Doctrine of the Soul's being Incorporeal; such as its Invifibility, natural Indivifibility and Immortality? ESSAY I.

This our Modern Corporealists seem to be aware of; and 'tis partly for this Reason, perhaps, that they seem entirely to have given up the Opinion of the Soul's being a Single Indivisible Particle (or Atom) and to hazard their Cause (with the Ancient *Atomists*) on the Supposition of its being a Composition, or, at least, the Result of a Composition of such Particles.

But that the Human Soul is neither a Composition, nor the Result of a Composition of Particles, may appear from the following Reflections.

First, That the Animal Spirits of the Brain in Composition (or as taken together) cannot be that Thinking Principle which is call'd the Human Soul, is evident. For that Thinking Principle must be Something that is Fix'd, not Volatile and in a perpetual Motion, as are the Animal Spirits: Otherwise our Thoughts would be in a continual Fluctuation and Confusion, and we should not be capable of steadily pursuing any one Design.

Besides

ESSAY Besides this, the Principle of Thinking must be but One Thing, not Innumerable Things, as are the mentioned Spirits: Otherwise our Sensations would be broken and incoherent, and our Consequent Actions less consistent and uniform: Numbers and Motion of Parts are therefore not to be supposed in the Principle of Thinking, or Soul.

Indeed, if we consider the Animal Spirits of the Brain, not as the Soul itself, but as the immediate Instruments of the Soul's Sensations of External Objects, their Motion, in that View, will be so far from appearing to be any Hindrance to Thinking, that it will be found necessary to excite it. For we must still remember, that even External Sensation is Thinking.

But at the same time, it must be considered, that tho' Motion may excite Sensation or Thinking in a Being endued with Thinking Powers, yet in other Beings nothing but Motion, and Change of Form or Figure can be the Result of Motion. For if Thinking should be the Result of Motion in Beings not endued with Thinking Powers, Something would be the Result or Effect of Nothing, or Something would

would spring from that which had **ESSAY**  
Nothing equivalent to it in itself. **I.**

If it be said, that Colours and Sounds are compounded of mere Figure and Motion in the Objects of Sight and Hearing, and yet are different from Figure and Motion; and consequently, that Thinking, though likewise different from Figure and Motion, may result purely from their Composition; I answer, That Colours and Sounds are not in the Objects of Sight and Hearing, any more than Pain is in the Objects of Feeling.

'Tis true, the Figures of the minute parts of Visible Objects, by means of the Motion of the Rays of Light, make Impressions on the Eyes, which by their Communication with the Animal Spirits of the Brain excite a Sensation which is properly what we call *Colour*. The Figure of the Pipe or String, together with the Motion of the Air, occasions, in like manner, the Sensation called *Sound*. And the Figures and Motions of the Particles of Flame excite the Sensation call'd *Pain*. But Colours and Sounds (as was said) are no more in the Objects of Sight and Hearing than Pain is in the Flame which is the Object of Feeling. They are pure Thoughts of the Soul; and was there



ESSAY no Being endued with Thinking Powers, and capable of these Sensations  
I. Figure and Motion, however compounded in the Objects, could never excite (much less produce) either *Colour*, or *Sound*, or *Pain*: For mere Composition cannot change the Natures of the Things compounded. The Composition or Mixture of Gold and Copper doth not produce a new Metal, but the compounded Metals are still Gold and Copper, as before: As a Chymist can easily demonstrate by separating them. And tho' the Pipes of an Organ, by Conspiracy (which is a Sort of Composition) are said to produce what we call Concordance or Harmony, which no particular Pipe of that Kind can produce, yet even in this Case, nothing happens but what is the result or effect of the Motion of the Air in each of the single Pipes; so that the whole Sett yields no more than what the Figures of the particular Pipes supply, by causing concordant or agreeing Motions in the Air.

From these Remarks it appears, that the utmost that the Composition of the Animal Spirits can produce to the present Purpose, is no more than an Agreement of Figures and Motions with

with each other, and likewise that ESSAY  
the Agreement of Figures and Mo- I.  
tions cannot change their Natures or   
make them different from what they  
were before. But if their Natures  
are not changed by Composition, their  
Composition can produce no Think-  
ing Powers in those Spirits. For if  
Figure without Consciousness pro-  
duces a Power of Sensation, or if Mo-  
tion proceeding from necessary Im-  
pulse produces a Free Power of Elec-  
tion or Choice, then Nothing produces  
Something. For to say that any Causes  
act beyond the Capacities of their Na-  
tures, is to say, that Something is  
done without any Cause at all.

Again, Neither the Animal Spirits,  
nor any other Composition of Parti-  
cles (tho' fix'd and closely united in  
the Brain) can be the Subject of such  
Sensation or Perception, as that of  
the Humane Soul. For as mere Com-  
position doth not change the Na-  
tures of Things, the Particles which  
compose any part of the Brain what-  
soever, cannot but retain their Di-  
stinction and particular Properties,  
notwithstanding the closest Composi-  
tion, as well as if they were at the  
greatest Distance from each other.  
Consequently, 'tis clear that each of

ESSAY the compounded Particles, tho' suppo-

II sed to be in some Degree Sensitive or  
~~~~~ Conscious; can be sensible of but a part  
of an Object. But if this were the Case,
there could be no Sensation of any whole
Object; for as much as there could be
nothing in the Compound capable of
uniting and comparing one part of an
Object with another, or of reflecting on
such Comparison: For Nothing, we
all know, can effect Nothing.

Suppose the Parts of a Looking-
glass to be endued with Sensitive Pow-
ers; suppose it likewise to receive the
Rays of any Whole Object; yet since
it consists of a vast Number of Parts
as really distinct from each other as if
at the greatest Distance, it follows,
that each minute Part or Particle can
perceive but a certain proportionable
part of the Object; so that whatever
is perceiv'd by any single Particle,
the other Particles cannot but be
entirely ignorant of. But as the
Glass consists of nothing else but
those mention'd Particles, it follows,
that there is nothing in the Glass
that is capable of uniting the sever-
al imperfect Perceptions of those
Particles, and likewise that therefore
there can be no perfect or complete
Perception of the Object, such as we
are

are conscious of in the Human Soul. ESSAY

From all these Considerations, the I.
general Conclusion is, that the Human Soul is no constituent Part of the Body, nor any thing resulting from or essentially depending on it; and by Consequence, that it is a Being essentially distinct.

SECT. IV.

If it be still queried, What then is this Thinking Principle or Being which we call the Human Soul, or How is it distinguish'd from the Substance of its Body? This Query cannot be better satisfied than by considering those Properties of our Bodies which we have observ'd to render them incapable of such Sensations as those of our Souls.

We have observ'd, that the Human Body, the Substance of which is usually call'd *Matter*, (because of the same Nature with the Materials which compose the visible Universe) is therefore incapable of such Sensations, because, like all other Compound Bodies, it is made up of extremely minute Particles, unfit to receive such a Variety of sensible Impressions, and naturally distinct from, and separable from each other.

'Tis

ESSAY

1.

on the contrary, that the Human Soul is of a Substance that is Simple or Uncompounded, fitted to receive a great Variety of Impressions from sensible Objects,, and not naturally subject to a Separation of Parts.

That the Human Soul must be One Thing, and therefore of a Substance that is simple or uncompounded, and not naturally subject to Separation of Parts, hath been already proved from Reason; and that the Soul is capable not only of acting upon the most subtile and refined Particles of the Body (*viz.* the Animal Spirits of the Brain) but likewise of receiving, through their means, a vast Variety of Impressions from Objects, is very clear from Experience. But if it be so, 'tis both very natural and reasonable to infer, that Beings which mutually affect each other, are to be supposed to have some general Agreement or Similitude of Natures. 'Tis therefore not unreasonable to conclude, that the Human Soul is a Being of a Middle Nature between the Nature of its Body and that of the Deity. For if it be affected by Sensible Objects through the Instrumentality of the Matter of its Body, this seems to argue it to be of a Substance

stance not wholly different from Mat- ESSAY
 tet; and if it acts on its Body by a I.
 Force inherent in itself (as we are ~~~~~
 conscious it doth) this shews a Sort of
 Power, which, I had almost said, we
 can no more comprehend than we can
 that Power which gave Motion to
 the greatest Bodies of the Universe.

I say, the Human Soul cannot, it
 seems, be of a Substance totally differ-
 ent from Matter, because it is Passive
 as well as Active. "For, as Mr.
Locke observes *, "Pure Spirit, viz.
 "God, is only Active, pure Matter
 "is only Passive; those Beings that
 "are both Active and Passive, we
 "may judge to partake of both."

This, at least, is the most natural
 Way of Thinking, and the most agreea-
 ble to the common Sense of Mankind,
 which declares loudly against certain
 Philosophers, who by stripping the
 Soul of every thing that belongs to
 the Idea of Matter, have refined it ei-
 ther into a *Pure Act* without any pro-
 per Agent, or else into a mere Com-
 plication of *Active Powers* without
 any proper Subject.

But however this may be under-
 stood, 'tis sufficient that we have
 proved

* Essay concerning Human Understanding, Vol.
 I. p. 264.

ESSAY proved the Human Soul is a Being essentially distinct from the Matter of its Body. For tho' we may not be able to form a complete Idea of the Distinction or Agreement between the Soul and Body, yet the Proofs we have produced, from the Nature of Sensation, of the essential Difference between them will, its conceiv'd, be Demonstrations, as long as it shall be true that a Part cannot be equal to the Whole, and that Nothing cannot produce Something.

Nor doth the Sensitive Faculty of the Soul yield the only Proofs of its essential Distinction from its Body, but the other Faculties combine to furnish the like Proofs; as will be shewn.

SECT. V.

That the Human Soul is separable from its Body, is a plain and necessary Consequence of the essential Distinction between them: We may therefore proceed to consider the Circumstances and Manner of its Separation.

The Soul being of a Substance that is Simple or Uncompounded, cannot, as we observ'd, be naturally subject to a Separation of Parts. But this

is

is so far from disqualifying it for a *ESSAY* Separation from the Body, which is I. no Part of it, that it rather assists us to explain the manner of it. For if this be so, 'tis certain in the first place, that the Soul must remain entire even after the Death of its Body, and must still retain the Powers and Properties which it before possess'd independently of the Body, unless depriv'd of them by some superiour Power. And therefore there can be no reasonable Doubt of its retaining its *Internal Sensation* of its own Particular Existence and Action, at least, according to the natural Course of Things.

And as for its *External Sensations* (tho' depending, at present, on the Body) yet if we carefully enquire into the Nature of them, we shall, perhaps, be so far from supposing they can either be lost or impair'd by its Separation from the Body, that we shall see Reason to think they will be more vivid or lively, because more immediately excited by the Objects themselves.

The Soul, while embodied, sees by the means of Images of Visible Objects form'd by the Rays of Light on the Bottoms of the Eyes, and hears by the means of Images (if I may be allow'd

E

the

ESSAY the Expression) of the trembling Moti-

I. ons of Sonorous Bodies impress'd by the
 ~~~~~ Air on the *Tympana* or Drums of the  
 Ears: Which Images affect the Nerves,  
 and by them the Animal Spirits of the  
 Brain, in like manner as the Objects  
 affect or work upon the Particles of  
 the Light or Air. But Sensations ex-  
 cited by Images, must be proportion-  
 ably more languid and faint, as the  
 Motions and Impressions caus'd by the  
 Images on the Nerves and Animal  
 Spirits are weaker than those caus'd  
 by the Objects themselves on the Rays  
 of Light, or on the Air.

Besides, as the Soul, in a separate  
 State, will probably have, other Sen-  
 sations to which it is now a perfect  
 Stranger, so 'tis reasonable to think its  
 Sensations will be not only more live-  
 ly, but more true, or more agreeable  
 to the Natures of Things. At present,  
 no other Sensations are excited in our  
 Souls by the means of External Ob-  
 jects, but such as our *Sensories* are  
 fitted to excite. Things appear not to  
 us naked as they are in themselves, but  
 cloath'd with Qualities foreign to their  
 Natures. What at present excites the  
 Sensation of Red, or Yellow, or any  
 other Colour, will when we have a  
 true Sensation, appear to be a very  
 different

different thing: As is clear from the **ESSAY**  
very different Appearances of Bodies **I.**  
when view'd through a Microscope. ~~~~~  
Therefore such who imagine that se-  
parate Souls must sleep, or remain in  
in a State of Inactivity, for want of  
organized Bodies to perceive and act  
in, appear to do little more than  
dream.

Neither do the Sensories (*viz.* the  
Eye, the Ear, &c.) diversify Sensati-  
ons, or cause Seeing and Hearing and  
the other external Sensations, to be  
properly what they are, and distin-  
guish them from each other; as some  
are apt to imagine. For 'tis reasona-  
ble to think that the Sensation excited  
more immediately by Visible Objects  
will be Seeing, as well as the Sen-  
sation which is now excited in us by  
means of the Images of those Objects:  
And so of the rest. At least External  
Sensation (which indeed is properly  
nothing else but Feeling) will always  
differ according to the different Im-  
pressions from Objects.

But if the Soul will be capable of  
the same or the like Sensations, it will  
doubtless be capable of the same or  
the like Joy and Grief, Desire and  
Aversion, Hope and Fear, and the

ESSAY other Affections which naturally follow Sensations.

I And as the Soul, in Case of its Separation from the Body, will be capable of the same or the like Sensations and of the Affections or Passions which result from them, it cannot but be most reasonable (as was observ'd) to conclude, it will still be endued with all its other Properties and Powers which it possesses independently of its Body. Consequently, since in its present State of Union it is capable, by moving the Spirits of the Brain, to move its Body (tho' loaded with other Bodies) as quick as Thought, it cannot be unreasonable to think it will still have a proportionable Power of moving both that and other Bodies at the time of its Separation: For we are conscious that this motive Power is a Power independent of the Body. But if so, we need not doubt of its Power to move itself, both at, and after its mention'd Separation. For being still as capable of perceiving, willing and executing as ever, it can, by Consequence, determine itself, at least, as readily as it now doth its Body, to any particular Motion or Operation; and having the mention'd Power of moving Bodies, it may be suppos'd

supposed to be sufficiently free from Obstructions and Impediments. ESSAY  
I.

It has been usual to go a much greater Length, by asserting that human separate Souls, and all other spiritual or Thinking Beings, are qualified not only to move Bodies, but to penetrate their very Substance or the Matter of which they consist. This proceeded from an Opinion that Soul and Body had nothing common in their Natures; an Opinion contrary to Experience, which shews that the Soul is, even without its Consent, affected or wrought upon by the Matter of its Body; and that it knows Matter, not by penetrating its Substance (as doth the Deity) but by receiving its Impressions.

But some will say, if separate Souls cannot penetrate the Matter of which Bodies consist, but are subject to bodily Impressions, it follows that they must resist and reflect the Rays of Light, and, by Consequence, become Visible.

I answer, This is no necessary Consequence. For there may be a Substance equal to an hundred thousand, or perhaps a million, Particles of Matter, and yet Invisible. For tho' a Microscope may magnify to an hundred



ESSAY dred thousand or a million times, yet

1. it cannot discover the Bulk or Figure of the proper Particles of Water and other Fluids. There may likewise be other Causes or Reasons of Invisibleness besides the extreme minuteness of Things; such as the extreme Swiftness of Motion, the Diffipation of the Rays of Light, and the like.

But is not Solidity (from whence proceeds Resistibility) a peculiar Property of Matter?

I answer, if by Solidity, be meant Impenetrability by Matter, (as must be allow'd) then, I conceive, 'tis most certain that Solidity is no peculiar Property of Matter. On the contrary, the Substance of the Great Uncreated Being, tho' absolutely Invisible, is the most transcendently solid, because absolutely Impenetrable either by Matter or any other Being: And thence it is that it penetrates, pervades and fills All Things. But this it doth without any the least Resistance; for as much as Resistance is only between Substances of equal or nearly equal Natures, such as are all created Substances; which by Consequence cannot penetrate any Substance.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

But notwithstanding that the Human Soul, as to its Effence, is independent of its Body and separable from it, yet while embodied it depends in most Cases, by the Will of its Great Creator, on the bodily Members as Organs or Instruments of Sensation and Motion. For we find, it can no more see or move, in the present State, without the Help of the Eye and the other Members, than a Person in a Place of Confinement can directly perceive Visible Objects in the Streets without looking through some Window or other Opening, or walk at Liberty without breaking his Prison.

However, this doth not hinder it from Acting even now, in some respects, independently of its Body, or, at least, above the Capacity of its bodily Sensories and Members. For,

1. It either hath or may have some Conception of the Divine Being, who is no Object of the external Senses, and who inconceivably transcends Matter or Bodies in every Thing that expresses the Perfection of Being.

2. It can form general Ideas from Individuals, tho' Individuals are the only Objects of Sense: And those general

ESSAY neral Ideas it can use as Standards;  
I. wherewith to compare Individuals.

3. It can determine itself to Internal as well as to External Action, and by reflecting on itself and its Actions can acquire and retain general Ideas of Reflection absolutely independent of the external Sensories: Which are infallible Proofs that it has a Sort of Memory inherent in itself.

4. It can improve upon its external Sensations. For Instance, it can have a Conception of the Distance between Objects both of the Sight and Feeling, independently of the Sensories of Sight and Feeling. From hence it proceeds, that a Man who has the Benefit of Sight can perceive one Object to be vastly more remote than another, tho' the Images of those Objects in the Bottoms of his Eyes are of equal Magnitude: In which Case, the Soul corrects the Sense of Seeing. And hence it likewise proceeds that a blind Man, by the Help of two Sticks, touching each other at their Extremities, and bearing against a Wall, can find the Distance of the Wall by the greater Acuteness or Obtuseness of the Angle which they make at the Wall: In which Case, the Soul improves on the Sense of Feeling.

Another

Another Method of its improving *ESSAY*  
upon the Senses, is, by its inventing *I.*  
of Instruments, by the means of which  
it brings remote Objects, as it were,  
nearer, and does, as it were, increase  
the Bulk of lesser Objects, and renders  
them distinctly perceptible.

5. It can make one Sense serve in-  
stead of another; As for Instance, by  
using Letters instead of Words, and  
Notes instead of inarticulate Sounds;  
Which is like rendering sonorous Bo-  
dies the Objects of Sight; whereas  
they are naturally the Objects of Hear-  
ing.

6. It can correct and improve not  
only the external Senses, but like-  
wise the Imagination: As in the Case  
of the seeming absolute Infinity of  
Extension.

7. It can improve upon the Bulk  
and Strength of its Body. For tho'  
the bodily Members are but little and  
weak, it invents Instruments or En-  
gines, by which it not only can sub-  
due the largest and strongest Animals,  
but can even break the Rocks, and le-  
vel the Mountains, drain the Lakes,  
measure the Heavens, and encompass  
the whole Earth. This demonstrates  
the natural Greatness or Excellency  
of the Human Soul. For tho', at pre-  
sent;



ESSAY sent, confined within the narrow Compass of its Body, yet it shews itself, in some Sense, equal to the Universal System of Matter.

I. 8. It can disengage itself, in some Cases, from its Attention to the Impressions of sensible Objects: And then it is that it exerts its noblest Acts. Then it is that tho' the bodily Eye is open'd in vain to visible Objects, yet the Intellectual Eye is turn'd towards Beauties of a superiour Nature. Then it is that it takes, as it were, a View of that most Perfect Source of All Things, from whence it sprung; it acquaints itself with its Supreme Happiness, and with the Paths of Virtue that lead to it; and, in effect, it anticipates that Happiness by conversing with Beings of a nobler Class in the most blissful Abodes.

Something of this Nature likewise happens, when its external *Sensories* are, as it were, lock'd up by Sleep. For tho' in our Dreams the Soul seems, for the most part, to be rather Passive than Active, yet sometimes it is observ'd to act with an unusual Vigour. The Transactions of several Months, or perhaps Years, are sometimes epitomiz'd and reduced within the Compass of a single Night. Eloquent

quent Harangues are made, and agree-  
able Conversation is carried on by promiscuous Company. Pertinent Questions are put, and smart Replies are made: So that our Dreams sometimes become the Wonder of our waking Thoughts.


ESSAY  
I.

9. It can reason well upon Ideas, even when the Imagination is disturbed. For tho' a distracted Person sometimes imagine he sees what he doth not see, or is where he is not; yet at the same time he reasons justly upon those false Ideas. Thus, for Example, If such a Person fancies his House is on fire, when it is not, he reasons nevertheless very justly when he infers from thence that he must call for Water to quench the Fire.

10. It can act with such Force on its Instruments, the Animal Spirits, as surpasses the Strength of the Frame of its Body; even to the breaking of Bones and Sinews. It can likewise oppose, restrain, and sometimes subdue the Appetites which spring from its Body, and can even destroy its Body by an Act of its Will.

These Instances demonstrate that the Human Soul is, in its own Nature, independent of its Body, and that if, in some Cases, it depends on its

ESSAY Body, 'tis only by the Will of its Creator;  
I. as before was said.



## SECT. VII.

But to proceed to a more particular Enquiry into the wonderful Actions and Powers of the Human Soul.

The first of its Actions which offers itself to our Consideration, is, its *Attention* to the Impressions of sensible Objects; from whence results *External Sensation*. This Sensation it acquires by means of the external *Sensories*, usually call'd the Organs or Instruments of Sensation; which, like so many Windows of the Body, transmit the Images of surrounding Objects.

Tho' it may be doubted, whether our *Sensories* are sufficient to give information of all Sorts of sensible Objects, or whether other *Sensories* may not be enjoy'd by some superiour embodied Souls, capable of supplying them with other Ideas, of which we know no more than a Man born blind or deaf doth of *Colours* or *Sounds*; yet they are ordinarily sufficient for our present Use and Preservation. And not only so, but by means of the Sensations and Ideas excited by their Assistance, and improved by the Help of Telescopes, Microscopes,

croscopes, and the like, we can cultivate an Acquaintance with a considerable Part of the Universe. We can, as it were, penetrate by the *Sight* into very remote Spaces, and delight ourselves with the Prospect of innumerable glorious Objects. We can mutually communicate our Thoughts in all convenient Situations, by the means of what we usually call *Sounds*. We can refresh ourselves with the *Odours* caus'd by the *Effluvia* of Bodies, even at a considerable Distance. We can relish an agreeable Variety of Food, and distinguish the Impressions of Tangible Objects. And the Ideas deriv'd from our *Sensories* being, as it were, treasur'd up by the Memory, improved by the Imagination, and corrected and refined by Reason, are so vast a Fund of Knowledge, as cannot but be amazing to any considerate Man.

## SECT. VIII.

The Act of *Attention*, being, as it were inverted, produces *Reflection*; from whence results the *Internal Sensation*. By Reflection the Soul (contrary to the Nature of Matter) turns inward upon itself, and views its own wonderful Properties and Operations.

By



ESSAY By this means it furnishes itself with clearer Ideas of its own noble Powers and Acts of Perceiving and Willing : Which Ideas are very different from the Ideas excited by the *External Sensories*. By this means it discovers a Sort of Creative Power within itself in new-modeling, correcting, abstracting, and otherwise working on the Ideas of sensible Objects. It sees itself, as it were, seated on an Imperial Throne, invested with a Power of acting on its Body, and, by means of its Body, on external Things, and that, usually, without Controul : Which View of itself, cannot but be very agreeable as well as surprizing.

## S E C T. IX.

On External and Internal Sensation more immediately depend the Acts of *Memory* and *Imagination*.

If we enquire into the Difference between the Acts of Memory and Imagination with regard to the external Objects, we shall perhaps find it to proceed purely from the different Sorts and Degrees of Motion in the Spirits of the Brain : Which Sorts and Degrees of Motion, in either Case, are not always subject to the Government of the Will. For even the more gentle

gentle Motion of the Spirits, which sometimes excites the Act of Memory call'd Remembrance, as well as the more vigorous Motion, which excites Acts of Imagination, proceeds very often from accidental Causes, not only without our Consent, but against our Inclination.

*Aboali*, an *Arabian* Philosopher of some Note, having spent much Time and Labour in searching into the Nature of Memory, was at last so amazed and confounded, that he was tempted to deny that there was any such natural Power in Man or any other inferior Being, and to assert, that it was either God or some Dæmon, at least, who excited the Ideas of Things pass'd.

But not to amuse ourselves with such Enthusiastick Philosophy, Memory, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, is no other than the Sensitive Faculty as concerned either in retaining or reviving the Sensations and Ideas or Notions of Things.

We have already observ'd, that the Sensation of internal Objects, and the Ideas and Remembrance, resulting from it, are independent of the Body. But as for the Remembrance of external Things, it depends as well as the

ESSAY the first Sensations of them, on the Instrumentality of the Brain. This may appear from the manner of our Sensations of external Objects, which seems to be this :

External Objects making Impressions on the *Sensories*, either immediately, or else by means of the Light, the Air, or of certain *Effluvia* or Reeks of subtile Particles proceeding from themselves, form by those Impressions certain Figures or Images of themselves in the *Sensories* (as is plainly to be seen in the Bottoms of the Eyes) and at the same time, move by means of these Impressions and Images, the Animal Spirits in the Nerves. These Spirits communicating a like Motion to some of the Animal Spirits in the Cavities or hollow Spaces of the Brain, may form by their means some very minute Images or Signatures (as so many Copies from Originals) on the soft interiour Surface of those Cavities; which Images or Signatures (tho' undiscernable to the Eye) by reflecting the Spirits towards the Seat of the Soul, may excite the Sensitive Faculty to attend to and perceive them.

Now, if the Motions of the reflected Spirits, occasion'd by those secondary

condary Images, are the immediate Occasions of exciting the first Sensations and Ideas of the Soul, the same Motions continued between the Seat of the Soul and those Images, must be the Occasions of retaining them.

ESSAY

I.

As for the Soul's Sensations of the suppos'd Images in the Brain they can, it seems, be no other than various Sorts of Feeling. If therefore the Soul is willing to revive its Ideas (or renew its Sensations of Objects) it may be conceived to do it by moving the Spirits in straight Lines towards those Images; by which means it may perceive or distinguish their several Properties, so as we distinguish the Inequalities in the Surfaces of Bodies, and the various Figures they compose by the means of a Staff or some other Instrument; but in a manner far more refined and perfect.

But if the suppos'd Images in the Brain become defac'd or erased, then must the Soul's Ideas of the Objects they represented be either impair'd or extinct; or, as we express it, the Memory of the Objects must be either in some Degree worn out or else quite lost.

Whether this be in all respects so or not (for there are some considerable Difficulties) 'tis certain, that both the

G

retaining



ESSAY retaining and reviving of such Sensations and Ideas depend some way or other on the Brain. For we find that the particular Remembrance of external Objects is sometimes either entirely lost or very much impair'd by a Wound or Blow on the Head, or by some other Accident affecting the Brain. Which shews, that the Ideas of those Objects are not fix'd in the Soul.

This Observation, that the Ideas of external Objects are not fix'd or inherent in the Soul, is a strong Proof that a particular Remembrance of those Objects is not to be supposed in the separate State, but that it depends entirely on a Body, as doth likewise *Imagination*, as far as it relates to those Objects.

#### SECT. X.

On the Acts of *Memory* depend those of *Imagination*. By this I understand the *Sensitive Faculty* as concerned either in *abstracting* or *compounding Ideas*.

'Tis by the means of *Imagination* that the Ideas or Notions of Things are diversify'd. It shews that the Soul is not obliged always to think of Things in the same Order as the Ideas of them were at first excited; but that it can, by the

the free Exercise of a Power inherent in itself, either separate the Ideas of Things that are most closely united, or unite the Ideas of Things that are at the greatest Distance of Time and Place; and that it in so doing can ascend above the Distinctions of Time and Place: Which is certainly a great Prerogative of the Soul, while united to a Body which is ever confined to both.

The surprizing Force of the Spirits which excite the Acts of *Imagination*, appears in Three Instances.

One Instance is their representing in our Sleep regular Scenes, and even Landskips of the Places we have been acquainted with, and sometimes leading us by means of those Representations over Rocks, Bridges and other Places of difficult and dangerous Access, as securely as if awake.

Another Instance, is, their representing Ideas so lively as to beget an Opinion in the Persons affected, even when awake, that they are excited by the actual Presence of real Objects: As happens frequently in the Cases of Fevers, Extasies and other Disorders of the Brain. Which Force of Imagination, as 'tis call'd, has been magnified by some Men of Letters to such a Degree, that one would think

ESSAY they supposed it to be a Sort of Divine

I. Power. For they have thought it, in the mention'd Cases, to have a real Effect on the external Air, by changing it into all Forms; so as that even others, whose Imaginations were not so extraordinarily employ'd, might perceive the Forms it caus'd. But this was, in effect, to suppose a greater Power in the Soul while embodied, than is, perhaps, necessary to be ascribed to it even in the separate State.

A third Instance of the Force of the Spirits which excite the Acts of Imagination is said to be their forming Signatures or visible Marks on the Bodies of Infants in the Womb.

As for the two first Instances, they may be sufficiently explain'd by the great Plenty and vigorous Motions of the Animal Spirits in the Brain, bearing against the supposed Images of Objects.

And as for the last, if it be really Fact, that the Spirits of the Brain, by their Communication with the other Spirits diffused throughout the Body of the Mother, can imprint Signatures on the Substance of the *Fœtus*, it teaches us the more easily to apprehend how the Motions of the same Spirits may (as was said before) imprint

print the Images or Marks of external Objects on the soft and yielding Substance of the Brain.

ESSAY  
I.

S E C T. XI.

After Imagination follow the two Sorts of *Comparative Sensation*, viz. the *Intuitive* and the *Rational*. The former is the *Attention* to, and Sensation of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, resulting from immediate Comparison. The latter is likewise a Sensation of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, but it results from *Intermediate Comparison*. The manner of *Rational Sensation* seems to be this: The Volitive Faculty, or Will, determines the Sensitive Faculty to attend to or view, as it were, the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; which because they sometimes cannot be brought so together and so placed in the same View as to admit of Immediate Comparison, therefore their Agreement or Disagreement, must be discern'd or perceiv'd by comparing them with some intermediate (or middle) Idea, or Ideas as a common Measure.

By this Account it plainly appears that (as we hinted elsewhere) Reasoning as well as Intuition, is properly but



ESSAY a more perfect Sort of Sensation, and  
 I. that Reason is not a distinct Faculty  
 from the Sensitive and Volitive Facul-  
 ties. Yet because it is usual to treat of it  
 (as likewise of *Memory*, *Imagination*,  
 &c.) under the Notion of a distinct Fa-  
 culty, therefore to avoid Obscurity and  
 Singularity, we shall choose sometimes  
 to submit to Custom.

According to this Account, it like-  
 wise appears, that *Sagacity*, *Judg-*  
*ment* and *Understanding*, being all of  
 them Acts of *Attention*, included in  
 the Notion of Reasoning, are not to  
 be consider'd as distinct Powers or Fa-  
 culties, tho' we may sometimes speak  
 of them as such.

These Observations, which reduce  
 all the Acts of the Soul to three Pow-  
 ers or Faculties, viz. the *Perceptive*,  
*Volitive* and *Executive*; and which  
 demonstrate that *Memory*, *Imagina-*  
*tion*, *Intuition*, *Sagacity*, *Judgment*  
 and *Understanding* (which are Ideas  
 either included in or connected with  
 the Idea of Reasoning) and even *Rea-*  
*son* itself, are no Powers or Facul-  
 ties; but only the same Sensitive  
 Faculty diversly consider'd may be of  
 Use to explain, what has been hum-  
 bly propos'd concerning the Doc-  
 trine

trine of the Ever-blessed TRINITY in ESSAY  
a former Treatise \*. 1.

'Tis something odd that certain People should unite with so much Zeal to decry that noble Act of the Soul call'd *Reasoning*, when consider'd in the General, who perhaps could not easily bear the least Reflection upon their own Reason and Understanding in Particular. We may observe there are two very different Setts of Men who join in a Sort of Confederacy to combat *Reason* with its own Weapons. Some seem to have a Design to oblige it to give place to an *Implicit Faith*; and others, under Pretence of mortifying human Vanity, appears to have enter'd into a Conspiracy against human Nature itself, with Design to sink themselves below the Condition of some of the more perfect Brutes. *Intuition*, say the former Sort, is vastly superiour to *Reason*. *Instinct*, say the others, is a much surer Guide.

But as for *Intuition* and the Self-evident Knowledge which it produces, tho' if they are universally extended, they are proper only to the Supreme Being (with whom it would  
be

\* The Christian Religion founded on Reason,  
p. 101.

ESSAY be Impiety for us to compare ourselves)

I. yet (as was observ'd) we are not altogether without them in some particular Cases. The Agreement or Disagreement of the Terms and Ideas of Propositions, call'd first Principles, are known to us intuitively, *i. e.* by immediate Comparison. But indeed, if we will know the Agreement or Disagreement of the Terms and Ideas of other Propositions, and by Consequence their Truth or Falsity, we must deduce them from first Principles and from each other by the Help of intermediate Ideas and Terms. Yet, even in this Case, the Connection of our Deductions, if right, is known, intuitively or immediately: So that even *Reasoning* is built on intuitive Knowledge. And tho' superiour created Beings are undoubtedly capable of more readily finding the intermediate Ideas which are used in *Reasoning*, yet when they make use of intermediate Ideas (as they sometimes must do, if their *Intuition* is not universal) they then do no more than reason.

As for *Instinct* (or the governing Principle of Brutal Action) it appears to rise no higher than Phantasy or Imagination, whereas *Reason* (as to its Acts) is both independent of Imagination

nation and superiour to it. 'Tis independent of it: Because when the Acts of Imagination are disorder'd, those of Reason (as we elsewhere observ'd) continue sound and vigorous. And 'tis superiour to it, because it corrects it, as was likewise observ'd: Besides, *Reason* sometimes shews its Superiority by making use of Imagination as its Instrument. By Imagination, as by a Prospective-glass, Reason (or rather the Soul in Reasoning) surveys Worlds in some of those seemingly little Sparks of Light, which we are apt to think were design'd only to guild the Skies. It views the happy Abodes of superiour Beings, and delights itself with Forms more glorious than those of any particular Object of Sight. In short, it discovers Mountains in a single Grain of Sand, and an Ocean in the least Drop of Water: Which are Operations far superiour to an Act of simple Imagination. *Reason* therefore, in most Cases, surpasses Imagination and Instinct; and tho' Instinct, in some few Cases, is a more ready Help, yet it is never a more perfect Guide than Reason is capable of being. But of this we shall treat more at large in the *Second Essay*.



ESSAY

To conclude this Section. As the

I. Capacity of Knowing and Remembering, is natural to the Human Soul, and Ignorance and Forgetfulness proceed merely from the want of Ideas, so the Capacity of Reasoning is likewise natural to it, and not absolutely dependent on the Matter or Structure of its Body. For tho', on Occasion of Blows or Wounds in the Head, there has sometimes seem'd to be a total Extinction of Reason as well as of Memory, because the Ideas depending on the Brain being obscur'd or disorder'd, the Soul could not, as usual, attend to the Work of Reasoning, which consists in very nicely comparing Ideas; yet the Capacity of Reasoning, we may be assur'd, was not extinguish'd in the Soul, any more than in the Case of Dreaming, when Imagination sometimes usurps the Place of Reason.

## S E C T. XII.


Another noble Act of the Human Soul, is, *Volition*, proceeding from the *Will* or *volitive Power*.

That Men have an internal Motive to Action, which renders them in most Cases, capable of determining and exerting themselves in different Manners, tho' in the same or the like Circumstances

Circumstances (and not as the Spring Essay of a Watch or Clock, which in the I. same Circumstances always exerts itself in the same Manner) was formerly thought to be so clear a Case, that even the *Stoicks* asserted it, tho' in other Respects *Fatalists*.

The Reality of such a free internal Principle of Action appears, first, from the Consciousness or inward Sensation that we have of it. It is likewise plainly seen in our equal Ability of choosing any one of two or more Objects of apparently equal Value: In which Case, nothing but the pure Resolution of the Mind can turn the Scale. It is also sometimes experimented, with regard to Matter of little Consequence, in our Ability to choose any one of two or more Objects of known unequal Value, without knowing ourselves to be influenced by any Motive but what is purely internal. For, to say we are influenced by any external natural Motive which we know nothing of, is certainly wrong; for as much as nothing, in the ordinary or natural Course of Things, can be a present Motive to us but by exciting in us some Thought, which Thought we cannot but be conscious of, and by Consequence, cannot but have some

ESSAY Idea of the Object by which it was  
I. excited.



These Instances prove clearly, that we have likewise a Power of Self-determination in other Cases, tho' it is not so usually or readily exerted, because contrary to Reason.

But when our own Sensations both internal and external (or both Consciousness and Experience) concur to assure us of the Reality of a Self-determining or Self-motive Power within us, it must be the utmost Degree of Obstinacy to deny it for no other Reason, than because some Difficulties may be started not easy to be explained. 'Tis well known, there are Difficulties in the Nature of all Motions whatsoever; yet certainly none but an Humourist would with an Air of Seriousness deny there is any such Thing as Motion, in Contradiction to the plain Evidence of his Senses.

This Self-determining or Self-motive Power, yields us a very convincing Proof of the essential Distinction between the Human Soul and its Body; for as much as no particular Part or Portion of Matter, that we certainly know of, has the Liberty of moving itself; but the several Masses of it appear

to be moved necessarily, according to fix'd Laws. And as there is not a Part or Portion of Matter within the Compass of our Observation, but what is moved Necessarily or by a Force impress'd, (not excepting even the Wind and the Light) so there is the greatest Reason to believe the same of all other Matter whatsoever. If therefore any Thing has an inherent Power of determining itself to Motion, free from any such Force, we cannot but have as good Reason to believe it is a Substance essentially distinct from Matter.

ESSAY  
I.

## S E C T. XIII.

Lastly, The *Executive Power* or *Faculty*, which immediately produces external Action, depends on the Volitive, and is a Power of whose manner of acting we have no positive Idea. However, negatively, we have sufficient Reason to think, that it is not always by Impressions receiv'd from Objects and again communicated, like the Action of Bodies on each other. For in Consequence of an Act of the Will (which is neither an Impression by Contact, nor the Effect of such an Impression) a Power is exerted on our Bodies, and the Motion of our Bodies follows immediately as quick as Thought,



ESSAY Thought, which manner of acting by

I. Powers inherent in ourselves, as it is quite different from that of one Body on another, so it is a sufficient Proof that the Principle of such Action within us is something essentially different from Matter or Body.

Thus we may observe, that all the Faculties of the Human Soul, (*viz.* the *Sensitive*, *Volitive* and *Executive*) yield sufficient Proofs, from the manner of their Actions, that the Soul is a Substance essentially different from and independent of its Body; and by Consequence, capable of subsisting and acting without it.

#### SECT. XIV.

But tho' the Human Soul is not essentially dependent on its Body, yet since it depends essentially on the Will of its Creator, how can we be assured that it will not be dispoil'd of its Faculties or even reduc'd to nothing by that Almighty Power that created it? Tho' it cannot properly die or be dissolved according to the natural Course of Things, because it is of a Nature that is Simple or Uncompounded; yet its natural Immortality can be no Security against Annihilation.

I answer, That it will not be dispoiled of its Faculties, nor annihilated or reduced to Nothing, may be argued from that Desire and Hope of Perpetuity or perpetual Existence, in Possession of their natural Faculties, which is inseparable from the Nature of Men; and likewise, more strongly, from the Justice of the Great Author of Nature in Governing the World. For as we cannot well imagine, in Consistence with his most Perfect Wisdom (and I had almost said Veracity) that we should be created with so universal a Bent towards Perpetuity, if not design'd for it, so neither can we, in Consistence with his most perfect Justice, (even though Revelation were silent,) believe that the unequal Distribution of Things in the Present State will not be rectified in a Future State; which, however, cannot be unless we remain in Possession of our Faculties. Add to this, that even the Particles of Matter of which Bodies are composed, remain in Being after the Dissolution of the Bodies to which they belong, and that no Man can prove that any one Particle or Property of that less noble Substance will ever be annihilated or reduced

to

**ESSAY** to Nothing : Which shews how lit-

I. . . the Reason there is to suppose the  
~~~~~ Annihilation of Beings or Properties  
of far more noble Natures; especial-
ly, since such a Supposition may seem
to argue Inconstancy and Want of
Beneficence; which are inconsistent
with the Supreme Perfection of the
Great Author of Nature.



THE



The Second Essay.

*Of the Humane Soul compared with
the Souls of Brutes.*

SECT. I.



Some Species of Brute ESSAY II.
 Animals seem to make
 near Approaches to the
 Perfection of Human
 Nature, so there are o-
 thers which appear to be very little
 removed from the Nature of Plants.
 But whatever the Degrees of Perfec-
 tion may be between some Sorts of
 those Animals and others; yet if they
 have Sensations of Objects, in some de-
 gree, like those of the Human Soul,
 'tis clear from what has been observ'd,
 that the very meanest of them are ac-
 tuated by something above the Power
 and Capacity of Matter.

I

Tho'

ESSAY

Tho' it doth not appear that the
 II. Sensitive Faculty in Brutes is capable of Reflex Acts, or at least, of Forming, by the means of them, clear and distinct Ideas of *Internal* Objects; yet we can have little Reason to doubt but they have, many of them, very distinct and lively Sensations of *external* Objects, or that they even excel Men in these respects. A Dog by his Smell will single out his Master among Thousands of others, and by the same means will find his Home, though many Miles off. Vultures and Ravens will Scent a dead Carcase several Miles. A Hart will hear the least Noise, and an Eagle see a very minute Object at a great Distance.

And as the external Sensations of some Animals are allow'd to be very quick and lively, so their *Memories* (to speak in the usual Phrase) are observed to be very tenacious.

But then, it seems, they cannot correct the Errors of their Sensations, any more than improve their *Sensories* by artificial Helps. And the Ideas they retain or revive are but few; and such Ideas as they have, relate chiefly to their own Subsistence and Preservation; or else to the Propagation of their respective Kinds. And

as for their other Ideas, they are (as ESSAY we are used to express it) easily defaced, if not deeply impress'd by Blows or other Severities or Allurements. II.

But by the wonderful, and, I had almost said, Divine Invention of Speech and Letters, for the Use of which Men are peculiarly framed, our Memories are qualified to be as so many Magazines or Repositories of the Productions of Nature. We carry the Universe, as it were, within ourselves, together with all the Periods of Time, and Distance of Place. So that, retiring into ourselves, we can view not only our own Original, but that of the World. We can become Spectators of the Revolutions of past Ages, and the Policies of the most early and remote Nations. We can, as it were, descend to the Center of the Earth, survey those dark (or at least hidden) Regions, and from thence mount up again to the Surface, take a View of the Varieties it contains, and thence direct our Course towards the Regions of Light, and lose ourselves in those Spaces of which we can never conceive an End. And these our Ideas of Things are oftentimes so lively, that some

ESSAY have been apt to imagine the Soul
II. was present wherever it bent its
Thoughts.

SECT. II.

Imagination or Phantasie, gives us likewise, in some respects, a considerable Advantage over the most perfect of Brutes. This, when directed by Reason, works in a surprizing manner on the Ideas furnished by Memory, either by abstracting, or compounding them to an almost infinite Variety. By means of this we form general Ideas, which serve as the common Standards of every Species of Beings in the known World, to assist us in the Search of Truth. By this we do, as it were, even create new Worlds, inhabited by Variety of new Species of Beings, and so furnish agreeable Scenes for our Amusement and Diversion. When under close Confinement this doth, as it were, set us at Liberty, it conveys us to the *Elysian* Fields, and places us among the Shades of Heroes. Nay, it even revives for us the famous Men of Antiquity, or else antedates our own Existence, and causes us to live in the first Ages of the World. And such is the Beauty of the Scenes and Images which

which Human Imagination presents, *ESSAY*
that, like some curious Pieces of *II.*
Painting, they seem to excel even ~~~~~
Nature itself; and the Pleasures
they give have usually more of Rap-
ture, tho' far less of Solidity, than
those that proceed from the Discove-
ries of Reason. This is the Cause
that Men of strong Imaginations, by
the Musick of Words added to the
Painting of Ideas, have always govern-
ed the Multitude, who like Chil-
dren, were ever taken with gaudy
Colours and empty Sounds more than
with the solid Substance of Things.
And because Imagination was equally
vigorous, even when Reason, for want
of Cultivation or Improvement, was
very weak and languid, thence it pro-
ceeded that Superstition made more
early Progresses than rational Reli-
gion, and extravagant Flights and Pa-
radoxes were of greater Antiquity
than solid Arguments: The rather,
because Poetry (among the *Greeks* at
least) was more ancient than Philoso-
phy, and was look'd upon by the cre-
dulous People as the Effect of Divine
Inspiration. And even in the pre-
sent Age, tho' Reason has been culti-
vated to so great a Degree, Men still
suffer themselves to be too much
swayed

ESSAY sway'd by Imagination, partly thro'

II. Indolence or an Aversion to strict Reasoning, and partly through Prejudice and an ungenerous Fear of being thought singular in their Opinions.

Though Imagination cannot furnish such an agreeable Variety to the Brutes as to Men, for want of a sufficient Stock of Ideas, yet in some few particular Cases, the Effects proceeding from it under the Notion of *Instinct*, are very wonderful.

Something has been already said concerning the Competition between Reason in Men and Instinct in Brutes. Instinct is thought to be nothing else but a strong Bent or Bias of the Imagination or Phantasie, necessarily inclining those Animals to perform certain Actions tending to their Preservation and to the propagating of their respective Kinds. But if this be a true Description of Instinct, then those few Actions which proceed from it, how regular soever, can be no Proofs of the superiour Perfection of Brute Animals; because performed necessarily, without either Contrivance or Freedom of Choice. Yet thus it appears to be from Experience.

ence. For tho' Birds build their Nests, or Bees their Combs with great Convenience and even Nicety, yet they seem to perform these Actions necessarily in the same invariable manner.

ESSAY
II.

The Productions of Reason, being the Effects of Liberty and Contrivance, are not only almost infinite in Number, but greatly diversified, tho' sometimes tending to the same End. Men are continually inventing new Models of Buildings, while each strives to build either more commodiously or more stately. But the Productions of Instinct in brute Animals of the same Kind are not only few in Number, but invariable and unimproveable: Which sufficiently shews the Imperfection of those Animals, and how little their most regular Actions differ from the regular Motions of some inanimate Bodies.

SECT. III.

Intuition, (the first Sort of Comparative Sensation) which, as we observed, is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas by immediate Comparison, is a Sensation common to Men and Brutes. For Brutes (as we have Reason to believe)

ESSAY lieve) are able to discern somewhat

II. of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas of such Things as make Impressions on their *Sensories*. For Example, a Dog, by immediate Comparison, may perceive that a Man is not a Horse or a Hare.

This we may conceive to be the lowest Degree of Intuition. But as for the Intuition by which the Connection of Terms and Propositions is known, 'tis what the Brutes are as incapable of as they are of Speech and Reason. And both these Degrees of Intuition are sufficiently distinguished from that most perfect Intuition whereby the Deity views the Essences of all Beings, and from that very extensive Intuition whereby superiour Created Beings may be supposed immediately to view the Truth of Things which are either out of the Sight of Reason, or else not to be discerned by us without the artificial Perspectives of long Trains of intermediate Ideas.

SECT. IV.

Reason (which we have observed to be the Principle of the other Sort of Comparative Sensation) is that which makes

makes the chief Distinction between *ESSAY*
Men and Brutes.

II.

As various Ideas occur to our Minds, it often happens that the Agreement or Disagreement of some Ideas cannot be discovered by immediately comparing them together. In this Case, as was observ'd, we make use of some intermediate or middle Idea or Ideas as a common Measure whereby to find the Agreement or Disagreement sought. Just as we measure two distant Mountains, and discover the Equality or Inequality (*i. e.* the Agreement or Disagreement) of their Proportions by means of a Quadrant. Which Operation is call'd Reasoning; and it supposes this Truth, that whatever Things agree with a Third, must likewise agree among themselves.

That Brutes have not this Degree of Perception or Sensation, may be inferr'd not only from their Inability to vary their most regular Actions (already spoken of) but likewise from their Incapacity to distinguish the Beauties of Painting and Musick; both which consist chiefly in Proportions. For from thence it appears, that tho' they may distinguish between any two particular Ideas, yet they can-


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not

ESSAY not form general Rules with regard
 II. to the Agreement or Disagreement of
 any Ideas; *i. e.* they cannot form
 Rules of Proportion. Consequently,
 they can have no Notion of Religion
 or Laws (which are no other than
 general Rules of Proportion with re-
 lation to Actions) any more than of
 Painting or Musick.

Musick is no Musick to any but
 an intelligent Ear, and Painting shews
 no Beauty but that of the Colours, to
 an unintelligent Eye. Some of the
 brighter Colours may indeed attract
 the Eye of a Brute; but the Figures
 they compose, are either quite disre-
 garded by him, or else mistaken for
 the Things they represent. Thus like-
 wise the smoother Notes may tickle
 his Ear, but their Composition and
 Harmony give him no Delight, but
 for the most part affright him; unless
 render'd familiar to him by Use, or
 made agreeable by the customary Al-
 lurements of Feeding or Sleeping, to
 which Musick may sometimes serve as
 a Call or Signal. The Reason is, he
 has not the Capacity of perceiving
 the regular Variety of Sounds, and
 the proportionable Agreement of long
 and short Notes; having no Notion
 of the Time, which is their common
 Measure.

Measure. The like may be said of ESSAY
Painting. II.

Dolphins, I confess, have been said  to be naturally delighted with Musick or Harmony; but this may perhaps be just as true as the Fable of *Arion*, which was built upon it. Some Birds indeed seem to imitate Musick by their Warblings: But it may be observ'd, that their wild Notes have little or nothing of what is properly call'd Musick; and besides, they are not of their own composing, but are as natural as either Crowing or Cackling. And as for artificial Tunes which they may have learn'd, it cannot be perceived that they are more delighted with them than with the Notes that are natural to them, or any other Notes or Sounds. For whatever Fondness they may seem to have of learning such Tunes, yet that is no more a Proof of any Rational Delight they take in them, than the Forwardness of a Parrot, or any other Mock-Bird, to learn and imitate the harshest Noises, proves there is any such Delight in them.

The Want of the Knowledge of Proportions in Brutes may be further exemplified in Dogs, some of the more perfect Animals. For tho' we may

ESSAY believe a Dog can very well distin-

II. guish his Master from another by his Sight, when his Master is present in Company, yet when his Master is not present, he cannot distinguish another from his Master so well by his Sight, but goes Smelling from one to another, and finds the Difference between them and his Master by his Nose: Which is a Proof that he has no fix'd Notion of the Difference of Features and bodily Proportion between his absent Master and another Man; having not the Capacity to compare them with a third Thing as a common Measure of both; to do which is the Work of Reason. 'Tis true, Things of different Bulk and Form are sufficiently distinguished by any Brute Animal, when the Difference is great; but even then, the Distinction is made either by the different Impressions that strike his external *Sensories*, or else by immediate Comparison; but not by Comparison with any third intermediate Idea, as a Measure of the Difference between them.

And as Brute Animals want the Capacity of Reasoning, so they want the Use of *Speech* (I mean discursive Speech) which is the Instrument and Interpreter of Reason. This proceeds
not

not purely from Defect in their Organs, *ESSAY*
but from an absolute natural Incapacity. *II.*
For tho' several Sorts of Birds very readily learn to speak articulately, and Beasts in general have a Sort of natural inarticulate Language, by which they express their Passions and Inclinations, yet (whatever may be reported) we have good Ground to believe they never become capable of Discourse in the natural Way; without which even articulate Speaking is no more a Proof of Reason than the Whistling of the Winds. And it was, as some think, from this Observation of the necessary Connection between the Use of discursive Speech and Reason, that the *Greeks* express'd them both by one Word, *viz. Λόγος*.

But tho' the Use of discursive Speech is certainly a very noble Qualification, and a wonderful Advantage; yet it is not the chief or only Thing (as some would insinuate) that sets Men above the Brutes. This is clear from the Case of such Persons, who being born deaf and wanting the Benefit of Discourse by Words, become the Inventors of a great Variety of other Signs, by which they discourse: Which clearly demonstrates, that Mankind, even without the Use of Speech, would

ESSAY would have been much more perfect,
 II. sociable, and improvable than any of
 the Brutes.

Besides, supposing that articulate Speech was an human Invention, it must have been contrived, and brought to some Perfection before Men could receive any considerable Improvement by it in regard to Knowledge in general, and Reasoning in particular. But the bare contriving of a Language by framing or composing Words to signify Ideas, was a clear Proof of a vastly greater Capacity than that of the most perfect Brutes, even antecedently to the mention'd Improvement by such Language or Speech.

But Speech is not the only Instrument of Reason; there are likewise *Letters* or *Characters*, by the means of which the Weakness and Imperfection of our Voice and Hearing are provided against, and our Speech, tho' consisting of fleeting Sounds, is, as it were, fix'd and render'd visible. This is still a greater Proof of the Pre-eminence of the Human Soul. For tho' all Nations have some Speech or other, yet some of them want the Benefit of the most noble Arts of Writing and Printing, which, as it were, give Visibility to Speech, where it cannot


cannot be heard. By these Arts it is that the Soul of Man confers a Sort of Immortality on itself, even in the present State, besides the Immortality it may expect in a State that is future. By these it reasons and communicates its Discoveries to succeeding Ages, even when its Body is reduced to Dust. But Brutes act with no View to Immortality.

Some Actions of Brutes are, however, observed to bear a near Resemblance of the Effects of Reason. A Dog will privately hide a Bone in the Earth, to be reserv'd against the Time when Hunger presses him. The Ants will gnaw the Grain which they lay up for their Provision, to prevent its shooting or growing. The Bees will make their Cells in a Hexahedrical Figure with great Exactness. The Tunnies form their Shoals in the Shape of a Cube, the more easily to keep together, and the more readily to steer their Course to any Side. And (not to forget what approaches nearer to the Practice of Men) the Bevers are said to build themselves Houses with convenient Apartments, and to make Slaves of such of their own Kind as they can master. Yet all these Actions (how regular soever) are merely

ESSAY ly the Effects of Instinct, disposing
 II. them to seek the Necessaries, and, in
 ~~~~~ some Degree, Conveniences of Life;  
 for their constant Uniformity or Inva-  
 riateness sufficiently distinguishes them  
 from the Works of Reason. They  
 perform them without Teaching or  
 Contrivance, and whoever shall go a-  
 bout to instruct them how to improve  
 those natural Actions, may as well  
 pretend to teach the Thistle to bear  
 Lillies or Roses.

And as for such Actions of Brutes  
 as proceed not from any Instinct or na-  
 tural Bent of their Phantasies, but  
 are taught them by Men, we know  
 they are taught them by the means  
 either of Severities or Allurements,  
 which work upon their Imaginations,  
 but not by the Instructions of Reason.

Their other regular Actions, which  
 proceed neither from Instinct nor Dis-  
 cipline, may be compared with some  
 common Actions of our own, which  
 are often regular enough, tho' per-  
 formed, without any previous Rea-  
 soning or present Attention, merely  
 by means of the natural Connection  
 of our Ideas. Thus the Ideas of the  
 Degrees of Distance are so naturally  
 connected together, that if we have  
 Occasion to come at a Thing out of  
 our

our Reach, we need no Reasoning to **ESSAY**  
 convince us of the Necessity of taking **H.**  
 the Advantage of a Stool or Ladder   
 to bring us nearer to it. And accord-  
 ingly we find that Brutes very readi-  
 ly make use of the same Helps, when  
 in their Way.

Upon the whole, there appears to be  
 no Necessity to suppose any nobler im-  
 mediate Principle of any of the Actions  
 of Brutes than Phantasie or Imagina-  
 tion. And as their Actions proceed  
 immediately from Phantasie and sen-  
 sual Appetite, so they tend immedi-  
 ately to the Gratification of that less  
 noble Appetite. Whereas, Men, when  
 under the Conduct of Reason, act fre-  
 quently with a higher View and from  
 nobler Inclinations. They seek not,  
 like the Brutes, the Food of the Body  
 and the Gratification of their external  
 Senses only. Their Appetite of Know-  
 ledge often excites their Industry in  
 the Pursuit of Pleasures of which the  
 Brutes have no Taste or Relish. In  
 Search of these, they measure the  
 Earth and survey the Heavens; they  
 inquire into all Parts of the Visible,  
 and even the Invisible World; tho'  
 not always with Success equal to their  
 Endeavours.



## ESSAY

## II.

## SECT. V.

Another Faculty of the Human Soul we have observ'd to be the *Volitive Power* or the Will; which when it regards deliberate Action, includes a Self-determining Power, from whence proceeds free Election or Choice. The Self-determining Power has been much magnified by some Philosophers. They call'd it the *Imperial Faculty*, and boasted that by his Liberty of Choice a Wise Man was capable of excelling even *Jupiter* himself, who, they said, was Good by pure Necessity of Nature, whereas a Wise Man was Good, or Benevolent, by Choice.

But tho' our Self-determining Power, as it imports a Freedom from Constraint, implies Perfection, yet, as it infers a Possibility of acting disagreeably to Reason (which Possibility is the only Source of evil Actions) it imports Imperfection. This may, however, be said to be such Imperfection from which no Intelligent and Free Agent, which is not perfectly Wise and Good, can be naturally exempted.

Liberty of Choice makes another very considerable Difference between the Human Soul and the Souls of Brutes.

Brutes. The Use of Speech among ESSAY II.  
Men is Free (for nothing is more arbitrary than the forming or choosing of Words) but the Language of Brutes is not taken up freely, but proceeds from a necessary Impulse of their respective Natures.

Besides this, as the Brutes have no Notion of Proportion, so by Consequence, they have no Notion of Equality or equal Proportion. Hence it is, that tho' equal Objects offer themselves, they consider them not as equal, but are driven by a blind Appetite towards one or the other, without determining concerning the proportionable Goodness, Fitness or Value. So that the Want of Reason in Brutes cannot consist with Liberty of Action; for as much as it excludes what is properly call'd Choice: But Men, can deliberately choose or refuse Things of known equal (and even unequal) Value. Which shews (as we before observ'd) that there is, together with Reason, a Self-determining Principle in Man, capable of exerting itself by its own native Force, without being compelled by the Strength of Phantasie or sensual Appetite, or excited by the Impressions of external Objects.

L 2      Consequently,

ESSAY Consequently, as Men, by means of

II their Reason, are qualified for the  
 Knowledge of the Supreme Being  
 and his Laws, so by means of  
 their Self-determining Power and  
 Freedom of Choice they are ca-  
 pable of Virtue and Vice, Re-  
 wards and Punishments. And hence  
 it proceeds, that Men, by the right  
 or wrong Use of their Reason and Li-  
 berty (or Freedom of Choice) are ca-  
 pable of much greater Happiness or  
 Misery than the Brutes. But of this  
 we shall treat at large in the *Fourth*  
*Essay*.

#### SECT. VI.

The Third and last Faculty of the  
 Humane Soul is the *Executive Power*.  
 But as this admits of little or no Va-  
 riety, and is common both to Men  
 and Brutes, it cannot be observ'd to  
 make any remarkable Difference be-  
 tween them.

The foregoing Reflections, as they  
 seem in some sort to exalt the Hu-  
 man Nature, so they tend, at the  
 same time, to depress Human Vani-  
 ty. For they teach us to think our-  
 selves the lowest Class of Intellec-  
 tual Beings, so little distinguish'd (as  
 to

to Appearance) from the most perfect of Brutes, that we are forced to labour to convince some even of our own Species, (who judge by Appearances only) that the Distinction is in any respect considerable.

ESSAY II.



The



to Appearance) from the most per- Essay  
fect of Præ-existence, that we are forced III



pearances only) that the Distinction  
is in any respect considerable.

## The Third Essay.

*Of the supposed Præ-existent State  
of Souls.*

### SECT. I.

ESSAY  
III.



THE Pythagoreans and Platonists, and, in general, all the more ancient Pagan Philosophers, who held Souls, both Sensitive and Rational, to be Substantial and Immortal, were of Opinion, that they eternally præ-existed, either singly or in their first Principle, from which they were supposed to have been taken: For *Nothing comes out of Nothing* was their constant Maxim. And even some Christian Philosophers (who hold not their Maxim) have from them derived the Opinion of a Præexistence, tho' they suppose it not to have been Eternal, but date it from the Creation.

These

These Christian Philosophers are used to argue, that it is not only unreasonable to suppose a Generation of Souls, but impious to imagine the Divine Creative Power constantly to attend on the Generation of Bodies by furnishing and infusing new created Souls, even on the Commission of Whoredom or Incest; and likewise that it is extremely absurd to think that Souls (which are such Noble Beings) are junior to every Atom of Dust. They therefore, with the *Platonists*, believe that Souls, both Rational and Sensitive, always co-existed with Matter, being clothed with thin aerial Bodies or Vehicles, before their Descent into gross terrestrial Bodies.

Was there no other Opinion in Competition with this Doctrine of the *Præexistence* of Souls, but only that of their Propagation by Generation, one might easily incline to the Side of *Præ-existence*. But the commonly receiv'd Opinion of the new Creation of Souls seems to be more eligible than either, notwithstanding the mentioned Objections against it.

As for these Objections against the Doctrine of Souls being newly created, drawn from the Impiety of sup-  
posing

Essay posing the Divine Power always to

III. attend on natural Generation, and

from the Absurdity of imagining the Nobler Beings to be Junior to the Baser; they may easily admit of Answers. For we may as well say, 'tis a Dishonourment and a Dehlement to the Sun to shine on a Dunghill, as that it is unbecoming the Deity to furnish Souls on the mentioned Occasions. For as the Sun doth not sully its natural Brightness by following its natural Course and darting its Rays on so vile a Thing as a Dunghill, so neither doth the Deity debase the Purity of his Nature by new Creations and Infusions in the Cases of Whoredom and Incest. For he acts only according to the Original established Order of Nature, tho' the Persons concern'd in those Crimes act contrary to their Obligations. Add to this, that the Opinion of the Infusion of Souls long since created is as liable to to the Charge of Impiety as this of the Infusion of Souls newly created. Yet the one or the other must be reputed the Truth, unless we imagine that Pre-existent Souls choose themselves Bodies without the least Dependence on the Divine Disposal.

As

As for Souls being Junior to Mat-  
ter, there is no more Absurdity in  
supposing it, than in supposing the  
House to be built and furnish'd before  
the Introduction of the Inhabitant.


ESSAY  
III.

## S E C T. II.

But besides these Objections, there  
are several Arguments produced in  
favour of the Opinion of Præ-exist-  
ence. For, say these *Christian Plato-*  
*nists*, Human Souls, after their Union  
with gross organical Bodies, are, as  
it were, confined or imprisoned, and  
condemn'd to receive their Ideas of  
external Objects through the narrow  
Windows of the *Sensories*; and some-  
times even to live, as it were, in Dark-  
ness by the stopping up of those *Sen-*  
*sories*. And as a Malefactor in a Jail not  
only has a very limited Prospect, but  
is often offended by the Noisomeness of  
the Place, so are Souls, say they, while  
thus embodied, not only confin'd but  
subject to be wrought upon by the dis-  
orderly Motions of the Animal Spirits,  
and to be render'd incapable of exert-  
ing some of their noblest Acts, by rea-  
son of internal Defects. The Seeds of  
Diseases, which they often bring into  
the World together with their Bodies,  
expose them to the acutest Pains, and




ESSAY to the growing Anguish of many lingering Distempers; in which a great

III.  Part of the Unhappiness of Life consists. But, say they, how are the Imprisonment and Torture of an Innocent even without his Consent, reconcileable to the Notion of a most Just and Good Being, who governs the World? Were it not therefore better, continue they, to suppose that Souls are thus punish'd not for the Faults of others, but for Crimes of their own, committed in a Præ-existent State?

But to this may be answer'd, that our Bodies, tho' they are in some respects Impediments, yet, when rightly disposed, they are sufficiently convenient Habitations for our Souls. And as for the Disorders and Pains, to which Human Souls, while embodied, are subject; Are not the Souls even of Brutes, which are supposed by these Philosophers to have likewise præ-existed, liable to much the same Inconveniencies? Are not the Souls of Brutes, tho' incapable of Crimes or immoral Actions, shut up likewise in gross organical Bodies?

Were it not therefore better to conclude that the present embodied State, is a State for which the Souls both of  
Men

Men and Brutes were originally de- ESSAY  
 sign'd by the Great Author of Nature, III.  
 and that the Inconveniences they are   
 subject to, are, at least, equall'd by  
 the Pleasure they at present enjoy, or  
 else that they may be more than com-  
 pensated by other Pleasures in a fu-  
 ture State?

S E C T. III.

But the Fondness of some People  
 for this Opinion of Præ-existence,  
 has put them upon attempting a more  
 direct Proof. Whether the World  
 was from Eternity, or whether it was  
 created by an All-wise, Almighty and  
 most Beneficent Being, 'tis plain, say  
 they, that in either Case, Souls must  
 be supposed to have existed before  
 they entered into organical Bodies.  
 For if the World was from Eternity,  
 they could not but be from Eternity  
 likewise; as being no Effects of any  
 Concretions, Combinations or Modi-  
 fications of Matter, but, at least, as  
 substantial Parts of the World as Mat-  
 ter itself. If on the contrary, the  
 World was not eternal, but created by  
 such a Being as beforemention'd, 'tis  
 most reasonable to suppose him to  
 have created Souls as early, at least,  
 as Matter; since to suppose so, is most

ESSAY suitable to his Goodness. For, conti-

III. nue they, if it was good for Souls to be at all, then the sooner they were the better; but the Goodness of God could not but incline him to the better Side.

With the Eternity of the World we have nothing here to do: For these are supposed to be *Christian Platonists*, and to believe a Creation. 'Tis therefore the latter part of the Argument, relating to the earlier or later Creation of Souls, which concerns us at present. The Perfect Goodness of the Divine Nature, say they, could not but determine the Great Creator to produce Souls, at least, as early as Matter: But how doth this appear? Was he not All-sufficient and perfectly Free as well as Good? Did his Goodness exclude Indetermination in every Case? To have created nothing but inanimate Matter would indeed have been unworthy his Perfect Wisdom as well as his Goodness. But since Matter was designed to furnish Habitations for Souls, was it not more suitable to his Wisdom (as we hinted elsewhere) first to prepare the Habitations, and then to introduce the Inhabitants? or could the Production of Souls

Souls a few Years (or even some thou- ESSAY  
sands of Years) sooner or later make III.  
any considerable Difference with re-  
gard to the Existence of Immortal  
Unperishable Beings?

To conclude: As the Proofs of the  
supposed Præ-existent State of Souls  
are very defective, so there lies a very  
great Objection against it. For, it  
may be said, if Human Souls existed  
in another embodied State before they  
enter'd the grosser Bodies they now  
inhabit, how comes it that they have  
not so much as a general Remem-  
brance of their Præ-existence in that  
State; especially since the Idea of  
Existence, attended with the general  
Ideas of Happiness or Unhappiness,  
depends not on the Body, but is fix'd  
and, as it were, riveted in the Soul;  
being preserv'd in our Sleep, and even  
in Apoplexies, Catalepsies, and other  
Diseases of the Brain, in which if we  
at any time imagine we had forgot  
ourselves, as we express it, yet some  
time or other it is found that the Soul  
was still awake and conscious not only  
of its Existence, but of its State and  
Circumstances?

The





## The Fourth Essay.

*Of the future States of Souls.*

### SECT. I.

#### ESSAY IV.



**H**AT the Human Soul will be capable of Sensation both Internal and External, and likewise of its other Affections and of Local Motion, after the Death of its Body, hath been shewn in the *First Essay*. The manner of its *External* Sensation after Death in a separate State, may appear from the following Reflections.

That it is not properly the Eye that sees, or the Ear that hears, or the Hand or any other Part of the Body that feels (as *Epicurus* held) but that the Soul, which is seated in the Brain, sees, hears and feels by the means of those Members, is plain from what has already

already been observ'd. 'Tis therefore no less plain, that if any of those Members by means of which Seeing, Hearing or any other Sensation is perform'd, were separated or cut off from the Body, yet if the usual Impressions from Objects were continued so as to affect, as formerly, the Extremities of the Nerves which once join'd to those Members, the Soul would, even without the help of those Members, have the same Sensations as usual. Accordingly we find, that after cutting off an Arm or Leg, the Patient sometimes feels the Cold as if it were in his Fingers or Toes. From hence we may infer, that tho' all the Members, Nerves, and even all other Parts of the Body were cut off from the Brain, yet if the Spirits in the Brain were still affected, or wrought upon in the usual manner, the Soul, whose Seat is among those Spirits, might still have the same Sensations. And finally, by the same method of arguing, if the grosser Substance even of the Brain itself were dissolv'd, yet if the Spirits, or any other subtile Particles, were still capable of being wrought upon by Objects and of affecting the Soul as usual, the Soul tho' separate from the Body, might, by their means, be capable of its usual Sen-

ESSAY Sensations. And this is true not only  
IV. of Rational, but of Sensitive Souls.

~~~~~ But some, perhaps, will say, If the Soul in a separate State can have Sensations of surrounding Objects without the Help of the external Organs of Sensation, how comes it that it is not at present sensible of the Structure and Situation of that part of the Brain wherein it resides?

To this I answer: As the Eye is the noblest of the external Organs or Sensories, so from the Structure of it, we may form some Idea of the Design and Contrivance of Nature in framing the common Sensorie in the Brain, which is the Seat of the Soul.

In the Structure of the Eye, Nature had plainly two several Ends or Designs in View. One was the preventing any wrong Tincture of the Images form'd in the Bottom of it by the Rays of Light. The other was the preventing of any thing that might draw off our Attention from those Images. The first of these Ends is gain'd by means of the whitish Colour of the Tunicle on which the mentioned Images are delineated; which preserves the Purity and Distinction of Colours in the Images.

In

In like manner, to prevent (as it seems) any such wrong Tincture of the Images or Signatures in the Brain, its inward Surface bordering on the Cavities, where is the Place of the common Sensorie is white, and of a Texture most capable of all Impressions.

ESSAY
IV.

As for the other End or Design of Nature in the Structure of the Eye, viz: the preventing any thing that might divert or draw off our Attention from the Images form'd in it, 'tis sufficiently obtain'd, chiefly by means of the Blackness of the Uveous Tunicle, which, as it reflects not any of the Rays which pass into it, is not at all perceiv'd by us while it transmits the pure Images of Objects to the Bottom of the Eye.

In like manner, to prevent any thing that might turn off our Attention from the supposed Images in the Brain, 'twas necessary that its inward Surface should be unperceiv'd by the Soul. To render it thus unperceiv'd, Nature (as it seems) contriv'd the Cavities or hollow Spaces of the Brain so anfractuous or intricate, that the Rays or Lines of the Animal Spirits, which, by reason of their perpetual intestine Motion, naturally reflect from the in-

N

ward

ESSAY ward Surface of those Cavities, are

IV. either broken or else so weak or confused that they cannot reduce themselves to a Point in such Numbers as are sufficient to cause any considerable Perception of that Surface in the Soul: Whereas, on the contrary, the Images of Objects are supposed to be so minute that comparatively few Rays of those Spirits may produce a Sensation of them. And tho' the Soul has Power over the Spirits, to move them more strongly in streight Lines against the Surface of the Cavities, yet this Power appears to extend but to few of those Spirits at once. For if it extended to all or any considerable part of the Spirits, the Soul would have it more in its Power to still or compose their Fluctuations, caused by violent Passions, and not be, as it were, overborn by them, as of ten happens.

But however this may be, 'tis most clear from what has been observ'd both in this and the former *Essays*, that unbodied Souls are still capable not only of Local Motion, but of Sensations both internal and external, and likewise of other Affections; tho' it seems, they cannot either retain or revive the particular Sensations of external Objects, and therefore cannot have any particular

cular Remembrance of those Objects; as was likewise observ'd.

ESSAY
IV.


S E C T. II.

But to render the Dependence of the particular Remembrance of external Objects on a fitly disposed Body still more evident, I shall proceed to answer an Objection or two.

It may be said, Cannot a Soul, when strip'd of its Body, see without an Eye and hear without an Ear? Why then may it not remember without the Brain or any bodily Substance equivalent to the Brain?

I answer, In Seeing and Hearing the Soul is only attentive to the Impressions which the Eye and Ear receive from the Objects of those Sensations, which differs little from its being purely Passive. But in the reviving Sensations caused by those Objects (which produces what we call Remembering) we are conscious that it acts vigorously on its Instruments the Spirits, and by them on the Brain. Therefore tho' the Soul, when strip'd of its Body, may very well be conceiv'd, by bare Attention, to acquire Sensations of external Objects without the Help of its Eye or Ear, yet it cannot be supposed capable of reviving the par-

ESSAY particular Sensations of those Objects
 IV. (or of remembering them) without
 the Instrumentality of the Brain or
 something equivalent.

Besides, As the first Sensations of Objects depend on the Presence of the Objects, and therefore cease as soon as they are removed; so the particular Remembrance of Objects, which depends on their Ideas revived by the means of the Brain, must likewise cease when the Brain is remov'd, and nothing else is capable of supplying the Want of it. For we have proved that those Ideas are not inherent in the Soul.

But if this be so, may it be said, what Notion can we have of the Memory of Intelligent Beings of a superior Rank?

I answer: 'Tis not unreasonable to think that all Intelligent Beings (the Uncreated Being only excepted) are naturally Souls, and that they were created to inhabit and actuate Bodies (as was the Opinion of many of the Fathers, and even of the Second *Nicene Council*) which Bodies, tho' more refined than the human Body, we may reasonably believe are so disposed as to serve as Instruments not only of external Sensation but of Memory; as well

well at least or much better than our groffer Bodies. ESSAY
IV.

To suppose there are many Species of Intelligent Beings gradually surmounting each other between the Human Soul and the Great Uncreated Being, is very suitable to the Analogy of Nature, and that Regularity which is to be observed in all its Works. We find a vast Variety of Species gradually descending between the Soul of Man and the Soul of the least perfect Brute; and why should we think it unreasonable to suppose a great Variety of others gradually ascending between the Human Soul and the Supreme Being?

S E C T. III.

Having thus cleared our Way, we may now proceed to consider what becomes of the Souls of both Men and Brutes after the Death of their Bodies.

Some People who were very well inclined to admit of the Immortality and Perpetuity of the Souls of Brutes, have found themselves so perplex'd how to dispose of them in the future State, that they have been at last tempted to assert either that they were dissolved

ESSAY solved or dissipated, or else annihilated or reduced to Nothing.

IV. But as for their *Dissolution* or *Dissipation*, it cannot be supposed, if they are Sensitive or Thinking Beings. For we have proved, that such Beings are not a Composition or any thing resulting from a Composition or Temperament of their Bodies.

Those who allow Sensation to the Souls of Brutes, and yet contend they are either a Composition, or else the Result of the Composition and Temperament of the Parts of their Bodies, do in effect deprive themselves of the main Argument (derived from the Nature of Sensation) which proves that the Humane Soul is a distinct Substance from the Body. For if Sensation be the Result of a Composition and Temperament of Parts in Brutes, why not in Men? This the famous *Des Cartes* was so well aware of (as was likewise *Pereira* before him) that rather than allow any Sensation to Brutes (to which he was not disposed to grant Immortality) he chose to reduce them to the State of mere Machines, or insensible Pieces of Clockwork. It likewise deserves to be considered, that the Writers who have most confidently pretended to prove the

the Soul of Man to be nothing distinct ESSAY
 from his Body, and therefore Mortal, IV.
 have chiefly grounded their Confidence on the Analogy, or Resemblance that there is between the Sensations and Actions of Brutes and those of Men, together with the common Opinion that the Souls of Brutes are not essentially distinct from their Bodies, but are dissolv'd or dissipated at Death.

As for the *Annihilation* of the Souls of Brutes, it cannot, perhaps, be proved to be absolutely inconsistent with Reason. For what Absurdity can there be in supposing a Thing to be Annihilated when it has fully serv'd the End of its Creation? But for ought with any Certainty appears, the End or Design of their Creation might not extend beyond the present Scene of Things. Yet since they are Substances, or as real Parts of the Creation as any others, 'tis more probable they will be continued in Being, for Reasons given elsewhere. *

* p. 55, 56.

SECT. IV.

In answer to the Query, How will the Souls of Brutes be disposed of, in case they are continued in Being? It might perhaps be sufficient to say,
That

ESSAY That the great Author of Nature who
IV. gave them Being, will, if he incline
~~~~~ to continue it, dispose of them in such  
Manner as is perfectly agreeable with  
his Wisdom and Goodness: But to  
gratify an innocent Curiosity, it may  
not be amiss to attempt a more par-  
ticular Answer.

We have observ'd that it is by  
means of that Part of the Body call'd  
the Brain that Souls, in the Present  
or Natural State, Remember, by re-  
taining and reviving the Ideas and  
Sensations of Things. Consequently,  
when separate from their Bodies, they  
may be supposed to be not only in a  
Preternatural but, in some Respects,  
an Imperfect State. It has likewise  
been observ'd, that merely Sensitive  
Souls, being Irrational and Necessary  
Agents, cannot be accountable for  
their Actions; and therefore cannot  
reasonably be supposed to be reserved  
for Rewards or Punishments on ac-  
count of any Actions done in the pre-  
sent State.

From these Premises it may not be  
unreasonable to conclude, that since  
to be embodied is their natural State,  
or their State of Perfection, and since  
no Reason can be assign'd for their re-  
maining unembodied, they will there-  
fore

fore pass from one Mortal Corrupti-ESSAY  
ble Body to another, till it shall IV:  
please the Great Creator to unite  
them to Incorruptible Bodies (tho'  
not by way of a Resurrection) and to  
place them in some Final State suited  
to their respective Natures; agreeably  
to the seeming Import of that most  
remarkable Text, *Rom. viii. 21. Be-  
cause the Creature itself also shall be  
delivered from the Bondage of Corrup-  
tion, &c.*

Whatever may be thought of this  
Text, it must be allowed, that the  
Considerations above, render such a  
Supposition highly probable. But as  
for the Case of Human Souls, 'tis not  
only probable, but certain, that be-  
ing Reasonable, and therefore Ac-  
countable Beings, they will be ad-  
judged by the most Just Governor of  
the World either to Rewards or Pu-  
nishments, according to the Nature  
of their respective Actions.

The *Pythagorean* Transmigration  
of Human Souls from one Animal  
Body to another, was, I confess, de-  
sign'd as an Expedient to salve the  
Honour of the Divine Justice by Re-  
wards and Punishments even in the  
present State of Things. But the Ex-  
pedient falls vastly short of the De-  
sign:



ESSAY That the great Author of Nature who  
IV. gave them Being, will, if he incline  
~~~~~ to continue it, dispose of them in such  
Manner as is perfectly agreeable with
his Wisdom and Goodness: But to
gratify an innocent Curiosity, it may
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been observ'd, that merely Sensitive
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sent State.

From these Premises it may not be
unreasonable to conclude, that since
to be embodied is their natural State,
or their State of Perfection, and since
no Reason can be assign'd for their re-
maining unembodied, they will there-
fore

fore pass from one Mortal Corruptible Body to another, till it shall please the Great Creator to unite them to Incorruptible Bodies (tho' not by way of a Resurrection) and to place them in some Final State suited to their respective Natures; agreeably to the seeming Import of that most remarkable Text, *Rom. viii. 21. Because the Creature itself also shall be delivered from the Bondage of Corruption, &c.*

Whatever may be thought of this Text, it must be allowed, that the Considerations above, render such a Supposition highly probable. But as for the Case of Human Souls, 'tis not only probable, but certain, that being Reasonable, and therefore Accountable Beings, they will be adjudged by the most Just Governor of the World either to Rewards or Punishments, according to the Nature of their respective Actions.

The *Pythagorean* Transmigration of Human Souls from one Animal Body to another, was, I confess, design'd as an Expedient to salve the Honour of the Divine Justice by Rewards and Punishments even in the present State of Things. But the Expedient falls vastly short of the Design:

ESSAY sign. For, besides that the most despicable and hateful Animals are capable of enjoying more sensual Pleasure than can well be supposed consistent with a State of Punishment, it may very reasonably be queried, What Punishment can it be to the Souls of bad Men, who delight to act the Parts of Wolves, Foxes, Swine and Serpents in Human Shape, to pass into the real Bodies of those Animals, and to act over the same Parts in the proper Shapes? And what Happiness can it be to the Good and Virtuous, who suffer at present by the Cruelty, Rapacity and Subtilty of wicked Men, to pass into the Bodies of Sheep, Doves and such-like innocent and defenceless Creatures, and become again liable to the same Calamities?

SECT. V.

As for the State of final Rewards and Punishments, which we oppose to the imaginary State of Transmigration; it seems not to be necessary either in point of Reason or Scripture, to suppose that it commences immediately after the Separation of Soul and Body: But it seems very agreeable to Both, to think that Human Souls,

Souls, when the Scene shall change ESSAY
to their Final State, will be fix'd at IV.
once in that State, according to the
different Natures of their respective
Actions. Consequently, the Opinion
of an Intermediate or Middle State of
Humane Souls between their Separation
from their Bodies and their Final
State, of Rewards or Punishments,
neither seems to be unreasonable
nor unscriptural.

Some Peculiar Favourites of Heaven
have indeed (according to the
Scripture Account) been put into
immediate Possession of their Final
Happiness: But the Scriptures give
us no sufficient Ground to think so of
the Souls of all other Virtuous Men.
On the contrary, the Final State of
Humane Souls is every where declared
to be consequent on the General
Judgment.

The Apostate Angels are likewise
said to be *reserv'd in Chains of Dark-
ness to the Judgment of the Great Day*:
Which is certainly a Figurative Ex-
pression; being an Allusion to a State
of Imprisonment in dark Dungeons,
where Prisoners are kept in Chains
till Judgment is past. And the Im-
prisonment or Confinement even of
those Evil Spirits, is represented to

ESSAY be neither so close nor so strict as to
 IV. deprive them of all Liberty: So that
 even the Devils appear to be in a
 Middle State, notwithstanding that
 Hell is said to have been prepared
 for them in particular. After the
 same Manner may the Souls of wick-
 ed Men be likewise supposed to be
 confined till the General Judgment:
 For 'tis said, that *Judas went to his*
Place, viz. of Confinement, and we
 read of the *Spirits in Prison.*

'Tis likewise not unworthy our
 Notice, that whereas 'tis said, *there is*
more Joy among the Angels in Heaven
over one Sinner that repenteth, than
over Ninety and nine Just Persons that
need no Repentance, there is no Men-
 tion made of the Saints rejoicing on
 such an Occasion; which 'tis reason-
 able to think would not have been
 omitted, if all the Saints (or Virtu-
 ous Humane Souls) since the Creation
 had been, immediately on the Death
 of their Bodies, translated into the
 Heavenly Mansions. 'Tis further re-
 markable, that, on the contrary, *A-*
braham, by whose *Bosom* St. *Austin*
 supposes the Intermediate or Middle
 State of Happiness to be meant, is
 said to be *ignorant of us.*

Befides

Besides the Testimony of St. *Au-* Essay
stin, we have the almost universal IV.
 Consent of the other Fathers (which
 may be look'd upon as the General
 Tradition of the Christian Church
 from the earliest Ages) on the Side of
 an *Intermediate* State. For as the
 Learned Monsieur *Daillé* in his Trea-
 tise *De usu Patrum* observes, the ma-
 jor Part of the ancient Fathers were
 of Opinion that Heaven was not to
 be opened till the Day of Judgment.
 Nor was this so general Consent of
 theirs (as he further observes) contra-
 dicted by any Declaration of the
 Church for the Space of Fourteen
 hundred Years; nor did any of the
 later Fathers pretend to refute this
 Opinion *. We may add, that the
 ancient *Jews* (according to Dr. *Po-*
cock) supposed the Happiness of de-
 parted Souls to be imperfect till the
 General Judgment, and their Resi-
 dence to be, not in Heaven, but in
 a Place which they called *Para-*
dise.

S E C T. VI.

As to the Nature and Circumstances
 of the *Intermediate* State of Humane
 Souls

* *Dallæus de Usu Patrum*, p. 107. Par. II.

ESSAY Souls there have been very different
IV. Conjectures.

Some have imagin'd, with the *Platonists*, that the Soul, when separated from it's Gross Body, would be cloath'd with a thin Aerial Body, which they thought was necessary to qualify it for External Sensation and Motion, neither of which could, as they thought, agree to a purely Immaterial Being, when strip'd of a Body. But this is a pure Notion of Paganism, and is far from being countenanc'd by the Christian Revelation. For that Divine Revelation says, not that we shall be cloath'd with refined and immortal Bodies before the Resurrection; but that then we shall be made like the Angels, or adorn'd with Spiritual or Angelical Bodies.

Others, who were likewise of Opinion, that Souls were perfectly Immaterial (or had nothing in common with Bodies) finding that the Scripture represents the Space between Death and the Resurrection as a Naked or Unbodied State, and at the same time concluding that Immaterial Souls could neither receive Sensations from nor act upon Matter or Bodies without the Help of Bodies, have thought that the Intermediate State
of

of Souls was a State of pure Insensibility and Inactivity, and have compared it to a *Sleep*. But this seems, however to be no necessary Consequence of their Opinion of the Soul's Immateriality. For whenever our Souls have Sensations of External Things even in the Present State, they have them not (according to these Gentlemen) through the Instrumentality of their Bodies, (which cannot act on what is purely Immaterial) but derive them from the immediate Operation of the Divine Power, which causes them to be so or so affected according as their Bodies receive such or such Impressions from other Bodies. But why might not Sensations have been supposed to be immediately excited in Souls by the Divine Power as well when without Bodies as when cloathed with Bodies, which (according to these Philosophers) contribute nothing to Sensation?

But that Souls when strip'd of Bodies, are still (without any such Operation of the Divine Power) as capable, or rather more capable, of External Sensations and other Actions and Passions than before, was shewn in the First Essay. The only Imperfection of Souls in the Unbodied State
seems

ESSAY seems to be the Want of a particular

IV. Remembrance of external Objects, proceeding from an Inability to revive Past Sensations: On which Account they are said in Scripture to be *ignorant of us*. Their Ideas or *Thoughts* of External Objects, and all their Schemes and Imaginations form'd on those Ideas, and the Particular *Knowledge* resulting from thence, *perish* and *cease* (as the Scripture says, *Eccles. ix. 5.* and *1 Cor. xiii. 9, 10.*) together with the Manner of their Sensation of such Objects; so that what Remembrance they have with Relation to those Objects of Sense, must be supposed to consist purely in General Notions of Things and Actions. Thus, they may still, in a greater or lesser Degree, preserve a General Notion of their past Conduct while embodied, of the good Use or Abuse of their Liberty, or of their Obedience or Disobedience to the Divine Laws. And 'tis Reflection on these that we may conceive most frequently to employ their Thoughts. So that the chief Happiness or Unhappiness of Souls in the Intermediate State must (as well as in the Final State) result from the Consciousness of their Good or Bad Conduct in the Present State.

Next

Next to this, we may conceive their Employment to consist in Speculation, For being deprived of the Memory of Corporeal Things, their Thoughts, we may believe, are turned, of course, towards Intellectual Objects. They contemplate the Nature of the Deity, of themselves, and probably of innumerable Species of Beings invisible to us. And this may be another Source either of Happiness or Unhappiness, according as they are differently qualified.

Such an Intermediate State is sufficiently distinguish'd from the imaginary *Purgatory* of the *Pagans* and *Romanists*, and it would be a Disparagement to any Man's Understanding to suspect it favour'd that groundless Opinion. Besides, who doth not see that the immediate Admission of the Souls of Saints or Holy Men into Heaven and the Detention of so many others in Purgatory, are Doctrines receiv'd and entertain'd by a certain Church with a View to secular Interest?

What has been observed concerning an intermediate State, seems indeed to destroy the Credibility of the usual Stories of the *Apparitions* of departed Souls, which Apparitions are commonly said to proceed from a

P

Desire

ESSAY
IV.
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ESSAY Desire in those Souls to settle some or  
 IV. other secular Affair; of which Affairs we have seen Reason to think departed Souls have no particular Knowledge or Remembrance. If therefore Apparitions at any time happen, they must, it seems, be supposed (in ordinary Cases at least) to be caused by some other Intelligent Beings; perhaps by condensing their subtile Bodies, and so rendring them visible. And this is the more probable, if it be Fact, that the Forms or Shapes of some Persons have been seen before their Death.

## S E C T. VII.

I am not unsensible that though an Intermediate State of Souls is favoured both by Scripture and Reason, and likewise by the Voice of Antiquity, yet there are some Texts or Passages in Scripture which are commonly thought to oppose it.

'Tis objected, That in the *Revelations* we read of the *Souls under the Altar in Heaven*, who continually cry for Vengeance on their cruel Persecutors.

But this is plainly a figurative Expression, and can signify no more than that the sufferings of Good Men in the Cause of Truth, are had in continual Remembrance by God. It

It may likewise be urged, That we ESSAY  
read in the same mystical Book of *an* IV.  
*innumerable Multitude of all Nations*  
*and Tongues* in the heavenly Man-  
sions.

But as this is only a Prophetical  
Vision, there can nothing be inferred  
from the particular Representations  
which it contains. Otherwise, we  
might infer there ate Armies in Hea-  
ven riding on *white Horses*, as is said,  
*Chap. x. ver. 14.*

But, may it be said, The noted Pa-  
rable of the rich Man and the Beggar,  
speaks of an immediate Translation  
of Souls either to Heaven or Hell af-  
ter Death.

To this I answer, 'Twas the Opi-  
nion of St. *Austin*, as was before ob-  
served, that by *Abraham's Bosom*,  
which is mention'd in this Parable and  
supposed by many to signify Heaven,  
nothing else is meant but the Inter-  
mediate State of Happiness. So that  
by *Asus* or *Hades*, which is here op-  
posed to *Abraham's Bosom*, and which  
our Translators have taken the Liberty  
to render *Hell*, he must have under-  
stood no more than an Intermediate  
State of Misery; and, consequently,  
'tis most probable, that by *Flames* and



ESSAY *Torment* he understood Self-torment-  
IV. ing or Remorse of Conscience.

~~~~~ But supposing Heaven and Hell to be here meant; yet as this is but a Parable, the Design of it was not to teach any Point of Speculation, but only to inculcate what we call the *Moral*, or Lesson which relates to Practice. The Opinion which some, without Ground, imagine to have prevail'd at that Time among the *Jews*, concerning the Immediate Passage of Souls either to Heaven or Hell, is indeed contrary to the clearest Hints that are given in the *Old Testament* with reference to the Future State; particularly to the two Noted Texts, *Job* ix. 25. and *Dan.* xii. 2, 3. Yet since that Opinion may be said to have yielded as good a Foundation for the Moral, which our Saviour had in View, — as the Truth could have done, he might here, as on other Occasions, accommodate his Discourse to the Capacities of the People, and direct their Practice without contradicting their Opinion. The rather, because their supposed Opinion, tho' Erroneous, differed from the Truth but in the Circumstance of Time, by only antedating

ting the Happiness and Misery of the Final State; which was a Matter of little or no Importance. Accordingly, the Learned have long since agreed, that not the Circumstances and Incidents, but the main Scope or Design of Parables is to be attended to. ESSAY IV.

The Words of our Saviour to the penitent Thief on the Cross, are likewise quoted on this Occasion, *viz. To Day shalt thou be with me in Paradise.*

But there is no Difficulty in this. For it must be supposed that our Saviour spoke to the Thief in a manner suitable to his Apprehension. He must therefore be allow'd to have made use of the Word *Paradise* in the Sense wherein it was then used among the *Jews*. But *Paradise*, according to the Use of the Word even at that Time, signified not Heaven, but an Intermediate State of Happiness *. 'Tis likewise certain, that the Soul of our Saviour himself is not said to have ascended into Heaven till some considerable Time after his Crucifixion. The Soul of the Thief was therefore with the Soul of our Saviour in the Intermediate State of Virtuous and Penitent Souls; which State

was

* Pocock, Not. misc. cap. 6. p. 176.

ESSAY was very fitly term'd *Paradise* and *Abraham's Bosom* (by way of Allusion to a Pleasant Garden and a Delicious Feast) as being a State of Happiness, though not the Final State of Rewards.

'Tis further objected, that the Apostle *Paul*, Phil. i. 23, and in another Place, declares his Desire *to depart, or to be absent from the Body, and to be present with Christ*.

In answer to this it might be sufficient to say, that the Expression *to be present with Christ* may signify no more than to be in the Custody and under the more Immediate Protection of Christ. For in such a Sense the Words of Christ himself, when expiring on the Cross, have been generally and with Reason understood, viz. *Father, into thy Hands I commend my Spirit*; forasmuch as it doth not appear that his Soul was receiv'd into the Glorious Presence of God till after his visible Ascension into Heaven.

But not to seem to have Recourse to a Figure without sufficient Reason, I shall humbly offer the following Reflections.

The Planet *Mercury*, as being the nearest of all the Planetary Chorus to the Sun, may be said to be most immediately

mediately present with that glorious Body. Yet this doth not hinder but that *Venus*, the *Earth* and the other Planets may likewise, in a proper Sense, be said to be present with it, as partaking of its Light and Influence, tho' in a less Degree, and at a greater Distance. Let us now suppose the upper World to be divided into two Regions or Orbs, one of which may be termed the Final or Heavenly, the other the Intermediate or Paradisiacal State of Souls. Let us further suppose the Glorified Body of Christ (agreeably to *Rev. xxi. 23.*) to be as a Sun diffusing Light and Influence on both these Orbs or Regions, tho' in unequal Degrees and at unequal Distances. On this Supposition, 'tis clear, that the Inhabitants of both these Regions may very properly be said to be present with him, because they all partake of his Light and Influence.

This Hypothesis is very agreeable to the Opinion of Divines of most Denominations; who allow that the Glorified Body of Christ, as at his Transfiguration, so now in his State of Exaltation especially, is very luminous.

But


ESSAY

IV. But some will further say, Did not the Protomartyr *Stephen* see the *Heavens opened*, &c. *Acts* vii. 56. and did he not, when expiring, cry, *Lord Jesus receive my Spirit*?

I answer, What *Stephen* saw, was indeed a Representation of the Heavenly Glory, for the strengthening of his Faith against his approaching Martyrdom: But no Man needs suppose it was an Opening of Heaven in order to his immediate Reception there. And as for his dying Words (which are like those of our Saviour on the Cross) they only express the actual Strength of his Faith and Confidence in Christ, for whose Cause he suffered; and they need not be supposed to signify any more than this, *viz.* " I commit
" my departing Soul to thy Care, to
" be reserv'd to the Enjoyment of
" that Heavenly Glory, for which
" thou hast encouraged me to hope."

'Tis likewise objected, That *Solomon* says, *Eccles.* xii. 7. *Then shall the Dust return to the Earth as it was, and the Spirit to God that gave it.*

But as this Text speaks of the Souls of All Men, both Good and Bad, without Exception; and as *returning to God*, in a proper Sense (*i. e.* entering into Heaven) can import no less than

than their entering into a fixed State, ESSAY
 therefore if it prove any thing to the IV.
 present Purpose, it must be this, *viz.* 
 that the Souls of the Wicked, as well
 as of the Good, are received into Hea-
 ven immediately after Death, to be
 eternally happy in the Beatifical Pre-
 sence of God. But this is too absurd
 and impious to be imagined. The
 Text then can import no more than
 this, that, after Death, the Souls of all
 Men, both Good and Bad, remain in
 the Custody and at the Disposal of
 their Great Creator.

'Tis therefore a figurative Expres-
 sion: And it may not be impertinent,
 on occasion of what has been here
 and elsewhere said, to observe, that
 the explaining in a proper Sense the
 figurative Expressions of the Scriptures
 (which, according to the Genius of
 the *Hebrew* Language, abound with
 them) has been, in my humble Opi-
 nion, the Original of most Errors in
 Divinity.

It must indeed be confess'd, that
 it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
 the figurative from the proper Sense;
 especially if we are led by Interest
 or Prejudice, and reject the Assistance
 that Reason offers. But in the pre-
 sent Case, Interest alone seems to

Q

have

ESSAY have got the Ascendant of Reason. For
 IV. whereas the Doctrine of an Intermediate State had prevailed above Fourteen hundred Years without any considerable Opposition, it was at last condemn'd, in the Fifteenth Age, by the Popish Council of *Florence*, which decreed, " That the Souls of Saints " were immediately received into " Heaven, and admitted to the Vision of God." And it is by this Decree that the whole Fabrick of the most profitable *Romish* Superstitions, with regard to the Saints, is supported; such as Canonizations, Invocation, Image-worship, Reliques, Pilgrimages, meritorious Vows, &c.

S E C T. VIII.

When the whole Human Race shall have fully acted their several Parts on the Stage of this inferiour World, 'tis perfectly agreeable not only to Christianity but to Reason, to think, that a general Day or Time of Account will come, when every Man, in the most solemn and awful manner, will be judg'd according to his Works.

As for the Opinion of a particular Judgment to be pass'd on every Man immediately after Death, 'tis humbly conceiv'd to have no manner of Foundation

dation either in Scripture or Reason, and to be no other than a Shift which some People have been reduced to in Defence of what appears to be an erroneous Opinion; I mean, the immediate Translation of Humane Souls either to Heaven, Hell or Purgatory.

ESSAY
IV.

SECT. IX.

But if separate Souls are, as we lately observ'd, in a preternatural and imperfect State, as having no particular Remembrance of many of their Actions in the present State, for want of a Power to revive the Sensations of corporeal or bodily Objects; which Power depends on their Union with Bodies; 'tis farther reasonable to conclude, that before the General Judgment, they will (agreeably to the Christian Revelation) be again cloath'd with Bodies, and furnish'd with the Means of reviving the necessary Sensations. These Bodies the Christian Revelation says will consist of the same individual Substance with their former Bodies, rais'd by the Divine Power, but refined, and in all respects so disposed as to be more capable of assisting the Soul's Operations. By the Help of these refined or spiritual Bodies (as it is not unrea-

ESSAY sonable to think) the Remembrance
 IV. of the minutest Actions and Circumstances of Actions will be revived, and all Men will be readily brought to confess the Equity of the Sentence of the Great Judge: For his Sentence will need no other Evidence to justify it but the Testimony of every Man's own Conscience.

One natural Reason for uniting Humane Souls to their former Bodies, rather than to others, may (as we elsewhere observed *) be drawn from the strong Inclination they may still be conceived to have to those Bodies, which Inclination, being Natural, will not be frustrated. But the chief Reason for such Reunion is furnished by the Christian Revelation itself, and is to this Effect. Bodily Death being one of the evil Consequences of the First Sin, and a Saviour being sent to make not only sufficient but abundant Reparation for all the Evils occasioned by that Sin, it was very fit and necessary that he should bring about the Reunion and Resurrection of Humane Bodies.

But what Bounds can be set to humane Curiosity? Some will here enquire, What will be the Structure of

* *Christian Religion founded on Reason* p. 137

of those refined Bodies at the Resurrection, and by what Ligaments will their Parts be held together? ESSAY
IV.

To this I answer by another Question: Who perfectly knows the Structure of our present grosser Bodies, or can tell us how the Substance of their very Ligaments is so closely and strongly connected or held together?

Besides, tho' we should suppose the Humane Body at the Resurrection, with regard to the Subtility and Looseness of its Particles, to resemble Air or Flame, yet it may not, like them, be capable of Dissipation. A faint Image of such a subtile Body we have in the invisible Particles of the Loadstone; which, notwithstanding the Opposition they meet with from other Bodies in passing continually through the Poles of the Stone, are not easily either obstructed or dissipated, tho' we have no Idea either of the Cause of their Motion, or of the Bands that hold them together.

But since the Scriptures determine nothing concerning this, we are at Liberty to imagine some Connection between certain Parts, at least, of those refined or spiritual Bodies: The rather, because on this Hypothesis, it may more easily be conceived how
the

ESSAY the supposed Images of pass'd Objects
 IV. may be both impress'd and preserv'd,
 ~~~~~ and consequently, how Sensations  
 may be revived and retained.

## S E C T. X.

The Final and most Important State of Humane Souls, which follows the General Judgment, cannot but deserve our greatest Attention. The Thoughts of this, tend not only to gratify our Curiosity, but to render us Wiser and Better. In the present State we are like Travellers: The greatest Happiness and Unhappiness lie before us; and it behoves us to be very solicitous about the Ways. For not the Pleasantness of a Way, but the End of the Journey is chiefly to be regarded. The Way to Happiness, as we all ought to know, is Obedience to the Laws of the Supreme Governor; the Way to Unhappiness is the Reverse. The right Choice will, at once, be our highest Wisdom, and truest Interest.

What Reason teaches with regard to the Unhappiness of the Final or Last State, is no more than this, *viz.* that it will be most justly proportion'd to the Demerits of the Disobedient. But as for the Happiness of that State,  
 Reason

Reason doth not proportion it to any Merits of the Virtuous or Obedient, but to the Beneficence of the Great Author of Nature, who is an overflowing Fountain of Goodness. ESSAY IV.

## S E C T. XI.

This Account that Reason gives, is indeed a very general one; and therefore as People are not wont to rest satisfied with Generals, Imagination has been set at work (I mean among the *Pagans*) to invent particular Descriptions.

The most noted Descriptions of the Happiness and Unhappiness of a future State of Humane Souls, according to the prevailing Opinions of *Paganism*, are given by those two great Poets *Homer* and *Virgil*.

*Homer's* Description is very plain, and agreeable to the Simplicity of that early Age. He supposes the Humane Soul to be nothing but refined Matter, capable of Pleasure by feasting on the Steam of the Blood of Sacrifices, and likewise of all the Variety of Torments from Instruments of Torture in a future State.

*Virgil* disposes of departed Souls (after their receiving Sentence from the Infernal Judges) either in a Sort of



ESSAY of *Purgatory*, or in *Tartarus*, or in  
IV. the *Elysian Fields*.

~ The Pains and Purifications of his *Purgatory* are described as of short Duration: After which the purified Souls, having spent a Thousand Years in *Elysium*, and drunk of the River *Lethe* or Oblivion, are said by him to return to live in other Bodies upon Earth.

The Punishments of *Tartarus* he represents as eternal, and as consisting in all Kinds of Torture.

The Happiness of the *Elysian Fields* he describes by pleasant Groves, Songs, and all such diverting Exercises as the happy Souls affected most in the present Life.

The Opinion of eternal Punishment in a future State, is pretended by the Poet *Lucretius* to have been the Original of all Religion. Which seems to argue it to have been both very Ancient and General. But whether such Punishment was generally supposed to be the Demerit of every Offence, or only of some more flagitious Actions, may be doubted. *Virgil*, 'tis certain, inflicts eternal Punishments on none but the open Contemners of the Gods, Betrayers of their Country, and other Offenders of the first Rank: The lesser Offenders  
he

he sends to be bleach'd in the Winds, Essay  
to be wash'd in a vast Gulf; or else IV.  
to be refined by Fire in his *Purgatory*. ~~~~~

This Poet supposes the Earth to be extended like a Floor; of which he conceives, the Heaven (the Seat of the Gods, and of so much of the Demi-Gods as was Divine) to be the Roof. Under this Floor he supposes a vast Hollow, divided into several Apartments, in which he places not only *Tartarus* or Hell, but *Purgatory* and the *Elysian* Fields, or the Seats of Happy Souls. *Tartarus* he represents to be as a Fortification moated round with a Lake of Fire, and encompass'd with a triple Wall, supported by Pillars of Adamant, not to be demolished by the united Force of all the Gods. Within this Place he supposes a vast Abyss, sunk twice as deep below the Surface of the Earth as the Heaven is raised above it; which Abyss he makes the Scene of the most dreadful and durable Torments.

Though this whole Description is purely Imaginary, as to Particulars, yet in the General, 'tis so far founded on Truth, as it supposes, what Reason upon the most solid Grounds admits, viz. That it will hereafter be

R

well

ESSAY well with the Good, and ill with the  
IV. Bad, in a just Proportion to their

~~~~~ Conduct in the present Life. It was likewise so far beneficial to Mankind, at that Time, as it served to deter from Vice and recommend Virtue, and as it represented to the discerning Eye, in the particular Accounts of those Imaginary Future Punishments, the real and natural Consequences of Vice even in the present State. Thus when the Earth-sprung Giants, who attempted to scale Heaven, were said to be sunk below all others in the vast Abyſs, it served to remind Men, that a Fall naturally follows Pride and Ambition, and that the higher one aspires to undeserved Honour, the lower he may be plung'd into Shame and Contempt. The like Morals might also be drawn from the Fables of *Tantalus*, *Ixion*, *Sisyphus* and others.

SECT. XII.

Though the Books of the *Jewish* Religion contain, as we believe, a Divine Revelation, yet we find in them no very particular Descriptions either of the Final State of Happiness or of Punishment; and the short Hints they give are plainly figurative.

Tophet

Tophet is said to have been prepared ESSAY
of *Old*, and is described as a Place of IV.
Torment by Fire. 'Tis likewise, said
that *they that turn many unto Righteous-*
ness, shall shine as the Stars, and that *the*
Wicked, at the Resurrection, *shall a-*
wake to Shame and everlasting Con-
tempt, Dan. xii.

But 'tis well known, *Tophet* or the
Valley of *Hinnom* (from whence the
Tivra or *Gebenna*, which signifies *Hell*
in the *New Testament*, is derived)
was the Place where Children were
sacrificed by Fire to the Idol *Moloch*.
The dreadful Solemnities of that Place,
were therefore used as a fit Emblem
or Figure of the Final State of Punish-
ment.

'Tis likewise certain, that the
Brightness of Stars, being what so a-
greeably strikes the Eye, can be no
unfit Emblem of Future Exaltation
and Glory.

Shame and *Contempt*, since they
cannot be supposed to have any Place
in the Final State of Punishment, must
also be look'd upon as Figurative.
For *Shame* is too nearly allied to Mo-
desty and Repentance to gain Admit-
tance among those whom Despair, and
the Custom of Sinning must be suppo-
sed to have harden'd to the last De-

ESSAY gree, And as for *Contempt*, it can properly have no place with those who being in the same State of Unhappiness, can have no temptation to exercise any Contempt of others; which can proceed from nothing but Difference of State or Circumstances, or some Inequality either real or supposed. And to imagine that either the Divine Being or Good Spirits should, in a proper Sense, condemn the unhappy Sufferers, would be to attribute that to them which is very unworthy of them. For Contempt is nearly allied to Pride and Insolence.

Therefore those Ideas of Final Happiness and Unhappiness, which are given us by the *Jewish* Revelation, being only Figurative, can import no more than that General Dictate of Reason aforementioned, *viz.* It will be well with the Good and ill with the Bad in a just Proportion, (at least) to their Conduct in the present State.

SECT. XIII.

The *Mahometan* Account of the future Happiness and Unhappiness of Humane Souls, if meant in a proper Sense, is very Gross and Sensual, and is confess'd, even by *Avicenna*, a noted *Mahometan* Philosopher, to be far from

from agreeable to the Dictates of Reason. The Happiness of the Future State, according to that pretended Revelation, consists in the Enjoyment of Magnificent Palaces, Flowery Fields and beautiful Gardens planted with Trees of Gold bearing most delicious Fruit; as likewise in the Pleasures of Feasting and the Conversation of beautiful Virgins in Shady Groves and by the Sides of purling Streams. The Account of the Unhappiness and Misery of that State is, that the Wicked shall be tormented with Fire and scalding Water and stung by Serpents bigger than Camels; and that when burnt and turn'd to Coals, they shall be rais'd again for fresh Torments.

ESSAY
IV.

We need only remark here, that the *Mahometan* Account of Future Punishment by Fire is partly taken from the Letter of the preceding Descriptions. For 'tis well known that *Mahomet* borrow'd most of his Doctrines from the more Ancient Schemes of Religion.

S E C T. XIV.


We may now proceed to consider the Accounts of the Final State of Happiness and Misery afforded us by

ESSAY by *Christianity*, the clearest and fullest, though not the last Institution of Religion.

Though neither the Old nor the New Testament speaks so clearly of any Particular Abodes of Souls in an *Intermediate State*, yet *Heaven* and *Hell* are very plainly represented as particular Places of Abode, not as States only. The New Testament especially is very express in asserting a Distinction of Places in the Final State: And in this it has the Suffrage of Reason. For agreeable Society is certainly a very considerable part of Happiness, and Company that is disagreeable very much enhances Misery. Which Reason is likewise equally strong to prove a Distinction of Places even in the Intermediate State, if any such State be admitted.

The Place of Final Happiness is generally agreed by Christians to be the Empyrean Heaven, beyond the Fix'd Stars. But the Place of Misery is disputed; only it's Situation is agreed to be somewhere *beneath* or below.

As for the Duration of the State of Final Happiness, though we have the greatest Reason to set aside Merit, yet no Man can make any Difficulty to believe

believe it will be Eternal: For sure ESSAY
no Man will seek to abridge the Di- IV.
vine Goodness. But as to the particu- 

lar Kinds of Happiness in that State, we are much at a loss: And no wonder, since the Christian Revelation itself tells us that the Glory of the Final State of Happiness is a thing yet *to be reveal'd*, and that it *doth not yet appear what we shall be*. From whence we may conclude that the Present State affords no Ideas, or at least, none that are adæquate to the Fruition of that State. Accordingly, 'tis said, *Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, neither hath it entered into the Heart of Man to conceive the things that God hath prepared for those that love him*, so that what the same Revelation tells us elsewhere of *Crowns, Palms of Victory, Rivers of Pleasure*, and the like, can be only Figurative. And certainly the Vision of the *Face of God*, which the Christian Revelation speaks of as the Perfection of Celestial Happiness, must likewise be own'd to be no more than Figurative.

Yet this last Expression, as we may observe, has a Tendency to direct us to place the Perfection of Future Happiness in Intellectual Pleasures. For *seeing the Face of God*, though Figurative,

ESSAY Figurative, can import no less than
 IV. this, that we shall hereafter enjoy a
 much clearer Knowledge of the Nature of God than at present.

But, probably, as the Notions of *Mahomet* with regard to Future Happiness are too gross and sensual, so, on the contrary, the Notions of some Christian Divines, who place the Celestial Happiness purely in Contemplation and Praise, are too much refined. For as both our External and Internal Sensations have been observ'd to proceed from one and the same Perceptive Faculty, 'tis not unreasonable to think that the Perceptive Faculty, in it's full Latitude, will be gratified in every suitable Manner, even to the utmost Extent of our present regular Wishes and Desires. And not only so, but that it will, as we before observ'd, be gratified with other Sensations which, at present, we know nothing of. And as Affections follow Sensations, no doubt but they will be likewise satisfied, in all innocent Manners, with agreeable Company (not excluding that of our former Friends) as well as with the most agreeable Objects; which seems to be meant by the Expression of *Sitting down*

down with ABRAHAM, ISAAC and JACOB in the Kingdom of Heaven. ESSAY
IV.

It may here be queried, Whether Knowledge, and the Intellectual Pleasure it yields, will in the Final State of Happiness be at once brought to the utmost Perfection, according to the several Capacities, or whether it will gradually increase.

In answer to this, it may be observed, That our Knowledge consists not merely in an Insight into the Natures, but mostly in a View of the Relations and Dependences of Things. But a bare superficial Prospect of the mutual Dependences of the Almighty's Works of Wisdom and Power (setting aside a thorough Insight into their several Natures) would probably be too large to be distinctly taken at once by any created Being. That therefore which may be more perfectly acquir'd by Degrees, will not (as we have Reason to believe) be less perfectly infus'd at once. And this is the rather to be believ'd, because we are told there are *Things which even the Angels desire to look into*. Our Happiness therefore will very probably be so far from being inconsistent with Increase of Knowledge, that it will partly result from it. But if this


S

be

ESSAY be true with regard to the Knowledge
 IV. of the Creator's Works, how much
 ~~~~~ more must it be so with regard  
 to the Knowledge of the Nature of the  
 Great Creator Himself? Increase of  
 Knowledge is therefore very consist-  
 ent with all the Happiness that Hu-  
 mane Nature in its most exalted State  
 is capable of. We shall indeed be *made*  
*Perfect* (as the Scripture says) but we  
 shall still be Men. We shall *see God*  
*as He is*, but so as the Eyes of our  
 Minds are capable of Viewing Him.

What has been observ'd of the par-  
 ticular Descriptions of Heaven or the  
 Place of Final Happiness, may like-  
 wise be remark'd of those of the Place  
 of Final Misery; which Misery is like-  
 wise represented as of eternal Dura-  
 tion. The Descriptions, of it are figura-  
 tive, and taken from such Things as  
 the present State affords. The most  
 shocking Ideas we are acquainted with  
 are excited, to deter us from Sin, the  
 greatest of Evils. We read of *the*  
*Worm that never dies*, and of *unquench-*  
*able Fire*. But the Idea of *Fire*, be-  
 ing taken from the Elementary Fire  
 in the Valley of *Hinnom*, and join'd  
 with the Idea of *Worms*, which is  
 plainly Figurative, may very rea-  
 sonably

sonably be supposed to be likewise ESSAY  
Figurative. IV.

We read indeed of Elementary   
Fire, which, at the Second Coming  
of Christ, will *devour or destroy the*  
*Wicked*, 2 Pet. ii. 12. Heb. x. 27. But  
this appears to be meant of Fire which  
will destroy the Bodies of such wick-  
ed Men who shall be found alive at  
that Time, but not of eternal Fire.  
Some ancient Fathers held indeed a  
Fire of Tryal, for manifesting the  
Works of all that shall have lived  
upon Earth both Good and Bad,  
grounding their Opinion on 1 Cor.  
iii. 13. explain'd by Mark ix. 4, 9.  
*Every one shall be salted with Fire,*  
*and every Sacrifice shall be salted with*  
*Salt.* But as they pleaded no Tradi-  
tion for this Interpretation, we have  
the more room to think they took  
in a literal Sense, what was meant on-  
ly in a figurative. For besides that  
*Salt*, which is here join'd with *Fire*,  
cannot bear a proper Sense, it must  
be allow'd that Fire, though a very  
proper Instrument to try Metals, is  
a very unfit one to try the Hearts or  
Consciences of Men.

To conclude, All that we can with  
Reason infer from the Descriptions  
of the Final States of Humane Souls,



ESSAY is, that it will be well with the Good  
IV. in such manner as suits the Goodness  
of God, and ill with the Bad in a just  
Proportion to the Demerits of their  
Crimes.

As for the Demerits of Crimes, we have spoken of them in a former Treatise; for which Reason we shall be brief. What is proper to be here added seems to be this. 'Tis reasonable to think that the greater Demerit of an Offence (consider'd without regard to Civil Institution) doth not proceed from the greater Quality of the Person offended (for that, in some Cases, may make it less, as it renders him less capable of suffering Detriment) but from the greater Personal Obligations of the Offender, and from the greater Sense he had of his Obligations at the Time he committed the Offence. Accordingly, an Offence against a mean Person to whom I have particular Obligations, is greater than an Offence against a Prince to whom I have none but what I have to the rest of Mankind in common And an Offence at a Time when I have a lively Sense of any Favour or Obligation, is plainly more aggravated than when the Sense of it is worn off.

If

If therefore, (by parity of Reason) **ESSAY**  
Offences committed against the Di- **IV.**  
vine Being are concluded to be the  
most heinous of all others, it pro-  
ceeds not immediately from the Per-  
fection of his Nature (for that renders  
him incapable of receiving or suffer-  
ing any Detriment) but from the Na-  
ture of our Obligations to Him;  
which are certainly the greatest of  
any.


Consequently, whatever positive Pu-  
nishment there maybe in the Final State  
of Misery, it will be duly proportion-  
ed to the Obligations of the Offend-  
ers, and to their Sense of those Obli-  
gations to the Divine Being. Which  
Obligations and their Sense of them,  
since they will appear to have been  
very different (as well as the Facts  
committed) therefore the Degrees of  
positive Punishment we must suppose  
will be no less different.

But tho' the Degrees will be diffe-  
rent, yet the Duration of the Punish-  
ments may be the same. For certainly  
the Great Judge of the World may  
justly exclude all those from Happi-  
ness for ever, who knowingly act con-  
trary to the Duties on the Perform-  
ance of which their Happiness was  
justly suspended.



A N  
E S S A Y  
O N  
C R E A T I O N.

ESSAY  
V.



SECT. I.

*S* the *Christian Revelation* first brought *Life and Immortality to light*, or yielded the clearest and most convincing Proofs of the Humane Soul's Immortality and Reunion to an Immortal Body, so the *Jewish Revelation* gave us the first Notice of our entire Dependence, with respect to Existence, Life and Immortality, on One Eternal, Independent Source of all Things. In both Cases, Revelation has taught us to soar to a Pitch above the sublimest Speculations

Speculations of mere Philosophy, by **ESSAY**  
encouraging us in an unwearied Search **V.**  
after the rational Proofs of these two  
most important Doctrines, of the  
Truth and Certainty of which it had  
given us such previous Assurance.

Tho' something hath been already  
said in a former Treatise, with re-  
spect to our Dependence on One E-  
ternal Being as our Creator, yet the  
Bounds I had then prescribed to my-  
self, being too narrow, 'tis hoped it  
will be forgiven me, if I here resume  
and enlarge on a Subject which is the  
very Basis of true Religion. In so do-  
ing I shall be forced to omit that ve-  
ry popular and copious Argument ta-  
ken from the Signatures or Tokens of  
Wisdom and Design to be observ'd in  
the Structure of the Universe, not on-  
ly because it has been sufficiently  
treated of elsewhere\*, but chiefly be-  
cause it doth not immediately affect  
the most numerous Sect of Unbeliev-  
ers; I mean the *Spinozists*.

*Creation* may signify the Production  
either of a new *Form* or of a new  
*Substance*.

That the World receiv'd a new  
*Form*, or that it was form'd out of a  
*Chaos* or indigested Heap of Matter  
by

\* *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 74, &c.



**ESSAY** by a most Wise and Powerful Cause,  
**V.** was generally believ'd by the more  
 ~~~~~ Ancient *Greeks* and others, who it  
 seems receiv'd that Doctrine by Tra-
 dition from the most early Ages. And
 even such among the *Greeks*, who de-
 nied the Existence of any such Cause
 were notwithstanding (many of them)
 convinc'd that the present Form of
 the Universe was not Eternal, tho'
 they ascrib'd it to *Chance*; which was
 no Cause, but a mere Notion made
 up of Blindness and Impotence.

ARGUMENT I.

Of this, the Poet *Lucretius* is an
 unexceptionable Witness, who tho'
 an Atheistical *Atomist*, argues from
the late Beginning of History, that the
 present Form or Figure of the World
 had a Beginning.

The *Greeks*, 'tis confess'd, from
 whose Histories *Lucretius* takes his
 Argument, are allow'd to have been
 none of the most Ancient Nations;
 their Historical Period, according to
Varro, beginning but with the first
 reviv'd *Olympiad*, which was not till
 the World, according to *Moses's* Ac-
 count, was about Three thousand
 Years old. Some indeed allow that
 their Historical Period began about

two Centuries earlier, viz. at the Destruction of *Troy*, which was about Two thousand eight hundred Years later than the *Mosaick Epoch*. ESSAY
V.

But tho', according to the *Mosaick Account*, the Age of the World is little short of Six thousand Years (which Account is not only much earlier than any credible Account of Time to be met with in the *Grecian Histories*; but goes higher than the Histories of most other Nations) yet how short is the Space of Six thousand Years!

It must indeed be confess'd, that three several Nations have pretended to a much earlier Account of Time than even this of *Moses*; viz. the *Assyrians*, the *Egyptians* and the *Chinese*. But the Vanity of their Pretensions may appear from the following Observations.

That the Pretensions of the *Assyrians* were vain may be concluded from hence, That *Calisthenes* going with *Alexander* the Great to the Conquest of *Persia*, and being desired by *Aristotle* to search into the Antiquities of *Babylon* preserv'd by the *Chaldeans* (who were, at that Time, a Sort of *Babylonish* Philosophers) writ back, That after the most diligent Enquiry, he could find no Ac-

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
count

ESSAY count of above One thousand nine
 V. hundred and three Years; which Years
 appear to have begun with *Ninus* the
 Son of *Belus* their first King *, agreeably to the *Mosaick* Account.

As for the Account of the *Egyptians*, we are assur'd, that it did not exceed the *Chaldean* Account above Sixty-seven Years. 'Tis likewise certain, they were a People guilty of extreme Vanity, and infinitely addicted to Fables: And their History, published by *Menetbo* and pretending to so great Antiquity, made its first Appearance (as well as the *Chaldean* History of *Berosus*) at or near the Time of *Ptolomy Philadelphus*, when the *Old Testament* was translated into *Greek*, and was probably forged (in part at least) in Opposition to the *Mosaick* Account of Time.

As for the *Chinese* Account, the Difference between that and the Account of *Moses*, has been sufficiently adjusted by allowing for the Difference of the Years, and it has been found to extend no farther than Four thousand odd hundred Solar Years backward. 'Tis likewise not well to be supposed that either the *Chaldeans*,
Egyptians,

* Vid. Loc. Calisthenis ap. Simpl. & Arist. 2do. de Cælo.

Egyptians or *Chinese*, if they had made ESSAY
 Astronomical Calculations so many V.
 Thousands of Years as they pretend, 
 could have remain'd so long ignorant
 of the true Theory of the Planetary
 Motions, and of the exact Method of
 calculating Eclipses.

But if the Histories and Polity of
 these most Ancient Nations were of
 so late Originals, what can it so rea-
 sonably be ascrib'd to as to the late
 Original of Mankind and of this Ter-
 restrial Frame of Things?

ARGUMENT II.

Add to this *the late Invention of*
Writing and Chronology (without
 which History could not well be pre-
 served or distinctly understood) toge-
 ther with the late Beginning of all
 other useful Arts and Sciences, and
 it will still amount to a stronger Proof
 of the late Formation of this Terre-
 strial Globe.

As for the Art of *Writing*; 'tis
 highly probable that *Moses* was the
 first Introducer of Letters as well as
 the first Writer of History. This
 seems to be confirm'd by the general
 Report of Historians, who agree that
 from *Phœnicia* Letters were original
 derived. Accordingly, the *Greeks* call'd
 their Letters, *ποινικέα γράμματα*, *Phœni-*

ESSAY *cian* Letters, because first introduced
 V. among them by *Cadmus* a *Phœnician*
 or *Canaanite*; who is supposed to have
 borrowed them from the *Jews*.

* Plutarch
 in vita Nu-
 mæ.

As for *Chronology*, 'tis certain that the greatest Part of the World were long ignorant of it: Or if they had any Notion of it, it was shewn in reckoning by Months or else by Years arbitrarily composed of more or fewer Months. The first Computation of the *Chaldeans* and *Egyptians* was by single Months, and afterwards by Years of four Months each *. The *Roman* Year consisted first of ten Months, and afterwards of twelve. The *Chinese* first reckoned single Months, as did the *Arabians*, *Americans* and others, till the Revolutions of the Sun (or rather of the Earth) became better understood. But that was not till very late. The first who reduced the differing Computations of Time to any tolerable Regularity and Exactness, was *Meton*, who invented the famous Period of nineteen Years, call'd the *Golden Number*.

The Names of the reputed first Inventors of most other Arts and Sciences are not only preserv'd, but are, many of them fresh in the Memories of the grateful Part of Mankind:
 And

And the Progress and gradual Improvement of all useful Knowledge may be traced in History within the Compass of Six thousand Years. ESSAY
V.

ARGUMENT III.

Add to this, *the Gradual Increase of Mankind*, and it will further corroborate the Assertion of the late Formation of this Terrestrial Globe. It has been observ'd, that the Number of Mankind (notwithstanding the ordinary Casualties of Wars, Famines, Pestilence and other Calamities) is usually doubled in the Space of three or four Hundred Years. Examples may be produced of such Increase out of the *Jewish, Grecian and Roman Histories*. But admitting an Increase of but one Person in an Age, the Increase of Mankind in an eternal Series of Ages, must have been so great as not only to have overstock'd the Earth, but (could a Passage have been found) to have replenish'd all the habitable Parts of the Universe, tho' it had been Millions of times more extensive than it is: For the greatest imaginable Extension bears no Proportion to a supposed actually infinite Increase.

Some will here have recourse to universal Deluges for reducing the Numbers


ESSAY bers of Mankind from time to time.

V. But as these cannot be supposed with
 ~~~~~ out a miraculous Interposition of some  
 Power superior to Nature, in order ei-  
 ther to the bringing on or carrying off  
 the Waters, and of a Providence, in  
 order to the Preservation of some of  
 the Humane Race from so general  
 Calamities ; such a Supposition can  
 be of no Service to the Cause of our  
 Adversaries.

#### ARGUMENT IV.

As Mankind gradually increase in  
 Number, so *Mountains* gradually *De-  
 crease* both in Bulk and Height :  
 Which, if it be not a further Proof  
 of the *late Original*, is at least, a  
 good Argument against the *Eternity*  
 of the present Form of the Earth.

Certain Hills and Mountains fa-  
 mous in History, are observed to  
 have been higher and bulkier than  
 at present ; and the same may be con-  
 cluded in some Degree of all others.  
 Their Decrease both in Bulk and  
 Height, may be ascrib'd partly to  
 the Force of the Winds, and part-  
 ly to the Washing of the Rains and  
 Torrents, which wear their Tops and  
 Sides, and carry down Quantities of  
 Earth, and sometimes vast Rocks, in-

to the Vallies. It may likewise have ESSAY  
happen'd through the Decay of the V.  
Texture of the Materials of which   
they consist. For vast Slices of the  
*Alps* and other rugged Mountains,  
have been known to fall off merely  
by their own Weight (as happen'd at  
the Destruction of the Town of *Pleurs*  
near *Chavennes*) without any perceiv-  
able external Cause; which could be  
ascrib'd to nothing but an internal  
Decay. Now these Gaps and Hol-  
lows in the Sides of Mountains, and  
the Diminutions made on their Tops,  
are never fill'd up or repair'd by any  
internal Principle of Growth, as far  
as can be observ'd. But if so, then  
the Causes having been always the  
same, the Mountains in a Succes-  
sion of infinite Ages, must have been  
entirely levell'd. Which since it hath  
not happen'd, we may firmly con-  
clude, that the present Form of this  
Globe of the Earth was not from  
Eternity.

To these Arguments, which re-  
gard the Earth only, I shall add  
two others; one of which regards the  
whole Solar System, the other the  
entire visible Universe.


## ARGUMENT



## ESSAY

## V.

## ARGUMENT V.



No possible Addition can render any Number actually infinite or absolutely Great, *i. e.* so Great as to make it Absolutely Impossible or Contradictory for it to become Greater. An Actually Infinite Number is therefore too Absurd to be supposed. Yet supposing an Actually Infinite or Absolutely Great Number, it would be still more palpably Absurd to suppose it to be exceeded by another Number.

But both these Absurdities must be believed, if we suppose the Present Form or Frame of the Solar System to have been from Eternity. For Instance. The Revolutions of the Planet *Saturn* about the Sun, each of which is perform'd in the Space of about Thirty Years, must, if from Eternity, have been Actually Infinite in Number, notwithstanding that continual Additions are made. But the Revolutions of the *Moon* about the Earth, each of which is perform'd in Twenty eight Days, must, if from Eternity too, have been vastly greater in Number than the Revolutions of *Saturn*; and so one Actually Infinite or Absolutely Great Number must have vastly, nay Infinitely, exceeded another

another, contrary to what was before. ESSAY  
V.  
observ'd.

If it be said, that the Revolutions of *Saturn* have not been more in Number (though greater Additions have been eternally made to them) than those of the *Moon*: I answer, This, to say no more, is very absurd, and a most fruitless Attempt to change the very Nature of Number, which consists in being Proportionable and Increaseable by Addition.

But if there can be no actually Infinite Number, and if, supposing such a Number, it cannot be exceeded by any other Number, it follows, that the present Form or Frame of the Solar System, and the Planetary Motions could not be from Eternity.

#### ARGUMENT VI.

Lastly. If the Form of the entire visible Universe was Eternal, it was absolutely Necessary, or it was absolutely Impossible it should have been otherwise than it was and is. For Eternity and absolute Necessity, with regard both to Existence and Essence, are the very same. But what was absolutely Necessary, or so Necessary as to render it Impossible for it not to have been, or been otherwise than it

U

was

ESSAY was and is, must both have been, and  
V. still be absolutely Unchangeable. But  
since our Experience will not suffer  
us to ascribe such Unchangeableness  
to the Form of the Visible Universe,  
consequently, we ought not to ascribe  
to it Eternity or absolute Necessity.

Not to repeat the mentioned  
Changes in the Surface of this Globe  
of the Earth, which, had they been  
gradually increasing from Eternity,  
would have quite altered the Form  
of it, 'tis certain that even that glori-  
ous Body which is as the Soul of this  
whole Planetary System, has not been  
free from remarkable and almost fa-  
tal Changes; Changes that cannot  
with the least Colour of Reason be  
pretended to have proceeded from  
Perfection, but which evidently im-  
ported Imperfection. Such was that  
Change that happen'd about the time  
of the Death of *Julius Cæsar* (men-  
tioned by *Pliny*) when both its Light  
and Heat were so debilitated, for the  
Space of almost a Year, that the Stars  
were seen at Noon-day, and the Fruits  
of the Earth were scarce ripen'd. And  
such another Change in the *Sun* is re-  
corded to have happen'd in the Reign  
of the Emperor *Justinian*.

Whether

Whether these *Phænomena* proceed-  
ed from Evaporations from its own  
Body, or from some other Cause, 'tis  
certain that surprizing Changes hap-  
pened in that great Luminary. And  
considering the Number and Bigness  
of its *Maculæ* or Spots, which in all  
Probability are not natural, but have  
grown by Degrees on its Surface, it  
needs not seem strange that some have  
been apprehensive that, in time, it  
will be totally cover'd with a thick  
Crust, to the utter Destruction of our  
Planetary System.

Add to these Changes in the *Sun*,  
the total disappearing of divers of the  
Fix'd Stars after having been visible  
many Ages: Which, whether it hap-  
pened through the Incrustation of  
their Surfaces or otherwise, affords a  
sufficient Proof that the Form of the  
Heavenly Bodies is imperfect and sub-  
ject to Change, and that therefore it  
hath not been from Eternity. The  
undoubted Consequence of which is,  
that (since *Chance* is now entirely out of  
the Question) they were form'd by  
some Eternal Being; who necessa-  
rily possessed the Perfection of Li-  
berty, or the Power of acting discre-  
tionally, with regard to other Beings,  
without any Change in Himself,



ESSAY whose Nature it was ever to be  
V. Self-active.

SECT. II.

This leads us directly to the Consideration of the other Notion of Creation, viz. that of the Production of a new Substance.

By the Creation or Production of a new Substance, or of a new Subject of peculiar Attributes, no more is meant than this : That whereas from Eternity there was nothing but the Divine or Absolutely Independent BEING, He by the free Exercise of his Absolutely Independent Power caus'd Something which was not before to Be.

In considering this Notion of Creation, we may regard it either as *Possible* or *Certain*.

The *Possibility* of the Creation or Production of a New Substance (or a New Subject of peculiar Attributes) may appear.

First, from the Creation or Production of New Forms or Modes, already demonstrated. For if these are not mere Nothings, then Something was newly created when they were produced. Thus when the *Moon* first began her Circuit about the *Earth* (for  
we

we have proved it could not be from Eternity) a New Motion was created or produced, which was Something that was not before. And thus, even now, when the Particles of Wood become Flame, something is produced that was not. But if Creation is not impossible or repugnant in a less Degree; it may not be impossible in a greater Degree.

Secondly, From the Existence of an Eternal Being.

That there is Something which was from Eternity, is one of the most evident Truths in Nature. To deny it would be to affirm the grossest Absurdity, *viz.* That Something began to be without any Cause at all.

Now, it is certain that every Thing that exists (or is) must have either a Cause or at least, a Reason or Support of its Existence or Being. But as a Cause that bestows Existence (if there be any such) must include in itself Power, so must a Reason or Support of Existence include or imply Power. Thus says *Seneca*, (tho' a *Pantheist*) *Deus sustinet se vi sua*, \* i. e. God supports or sustains himself by his own Power.

Therefore

\* In Quæst. Nat. Lib. II. cap. 1.

ESSAY

V. Therefore (by *Seneca's* Confession) since the Support of the Existence of the Eternal Being must be within Himself, He cannot but have Power in Himself. But that Power of the Eternal Being which is the Support of his Existence; may certainly be the Cause of the Existence of Other Beings. For the supporting or sustaining of Existence cannot but be equivalent to the bestowing it.

This Power of the Eternal Being which is ever Active and sustains his Existence hath disposed some to stile Him *His own Cause*. And this Manner of speaking even *Spinoza*, the famous modern *Pantheist*, has thought fit to conform to.

Again, (to draw another Proof from this) when we say that the Eternal Being hath a Power of supporting or sustaining his own Existence, we say that his Power is Perfect, or Absolutely Independent both in Existing and in Acting. For the sustaining Himself by his own Power includes both these Notions of Independence. But when we say, the Eternal Being hath the Power of Creating or Producing a New Substance from Nothing, we say no more than, as before, that his Power is  
Absolutely

absolutely Independent in Acting. For ESSAY  
as it cannot be absolutely Independent V.  
in Acting, if the Effect of its Acting  
necessarily depends on any thing but  
itself, it therefore doth not necessa-  
rily require or depend on any Ma-  
terials to act upon: Which is the  
same as to say, it can create from  
Nothing.

Thirdly, From the Notion of a  
Contradictory, Repugnant or Incon-  
sistent Proposition. All such Propo-  
sitions import Being and not Being,  
Something and Nothing, at the same  
Time and in the same Manner. But  
if so, then a Thing's not Being and  
Being at *different* Times is not a Con-  
tradiction, Repugnance or Inconsi-  
stence. Therefore the Creation  
of a New Substance from Nothing is  
possible to a Power that is Perfect, or  
that extends to every Action that im-  
plies not a Contradiction, Repugnance  
or Inconsistency.

## SECT. III.

These Arguments (if I mistake not)  
plainly demonstrate the *Possibility*; the  
*Certainty* of the Creation of a New  
Substance from Nothing will ap-  
pear.

1<sup>st</sup>, From



ESSAY I<sup>st</sup>, From the Perfection of the  
 V. Nature of the Eternal Independent  
 Being, compared with the Imperfec-  
 tion of the Nature of the Visible  
 Universe.

To be able to Exist Eternally or Independently, or without the Influence or Causality of Another, is the highest Degree of Sufficiency. But the highest Degree of Sufficiency cannot but include the most perfect Power, and where there is the most perfect Power, there can be no Defect or Imperfection, because every Defect argues Impotence or Want of Power.

But where shall we find the Tokens of this most perfect Power? What Proof can the Whole Visible Universe yield us of the real Existence of such a Power, otherwise than by convincing us by its Defects of its absolute Inability to Exist but a single Moment independently of such a Power in some Superiour Being? The Passive Nature of all its Parts (big with many other Imperfections) is such a Defect as is diametrically opposite to the Nature of perfect Power, and consequently to independent Existence. If they move, 'tis because they are moved: For as they cannot change  
 the

the Direction of their Motions, 'tis sufficiently plain that they have neither Power nor Liberty to move themselves. Could the Planets but suspend their Courses round the Sun for the Space but of one of their Revolutions, or could a Stone, by changing it's Course, return to the Hand that flung it, we might have Cause to think they had a Power of Self-motion. But as this never happens nor is even pretended to be possible by the *Hobbiſts* and *Spinoſiſts* themselves, (who suppose an Eternal Circulation of Motion) we may conclude the Parts of Matter, and the Whole which they compose, are merely Passive and Impotent.

Besides, if we make an Analysis of any particular Body or Portion of Matter, what do we find but a Heap of Dust? So that even the Sun, Moon and all the visible Stars may justly be reputed but so many small Parcels of Dust scatter'd here and there along the vast Expansion; being much less in Proportion to the Space of the Visible Heavens, which they seem almost to fill, than the Fishes are to the Ocean. For certainly they are not in Themselves more Noble, than the Matter of which they consist.

ESSAY fifth. They receive all their Greatness and Beauty from their Composition, and shine with Glories not their own.

But if the entire Visible Universe be so mean and inconsiderable, what shall we think of a single Atom or Particle, that hath scarce any thing more than Form or Figure to distinguish it from Nothing? Yet such a diminutive, impotent thing as a single Particle hath as good a Claim to Eternal Existence as the Whole System of Matter.

From what has been here observed of the Impotent and Passive Nature of Matter, join'd with its other Imperfections, we may firmly conclude that it was not from Eternity.

1. Because being void of all Power, it has no Support of its Existence within itself, as an Eternal Being cannot but have; and,

2. Because, being Imperfect in so many Respects, it can be no absolute Impossibility or Repugnance for it to become imperfect in other Respects: Which is directly contrary to the Nature of an Eternal or Necessarily Existent Being; for such a Being, as it cannot but be Perfect, so it cannot without an Absolute Repugnance

pugnance be supposed subject to the Possibility of existing otherwise than it actually and necessarily exists. ESSAY  
V.

But if Matter was not from Eternity, 'tis certain that it once began to Be, or that it was created from Nothing.

2. Another Proof of the Certainty of the Creation of a New Substance from Nothing, may be derived from the actual *Penetration* of the Whole Visible Universe by a Substance or Nature that is more Perfect.

Such a Penetration appears very clearly from the Nature of *Gravitation*, or the Tendency of Bodies towards some or other Centre.

'Tis certain, that the several Parts of the Visible Universe do not gravitate, or tend towards their Centers, in an exact Proportion to the Extent of their Surface, but only according to their solid Contents or real Bulk, or the Number of the Particles of which they consist. That this cannot proceed from any necessary independent Power, inherent in their Particles, is plain; because their Gravitation always varies according to different Situations, as is well known. 'Tis likewise plain that their Gravitation and its Variation being both in a just



ESSAY Proportion to their solid Contents or  
V. the Number of their Particles, cannot depend upon any Cause whose Substance and Power are not every where the same, or which doth not penetrate the Bulk of their Particles. There is therefore something that pervades the very Substance of the Material Universe, and which possesses, as it were, its very Nature, impressing and regulating the Natural Motions of its several Parts according to their different Situations.

But whence proceeded this Superiority and, as it were, Propriety of one Being over and in another? Natures that are both of them supposed eternal or equally necessary with Regard to Existence, could have no natural Inequality with Regard to Perfection. For the Eternal Necessity being simple, or not diversified by any præ-existent Will, could not be the Foundation of Inequality of Perfection in divers Beings. Consequently, the less perfect Substance or Being could not be Eternal or Absolutely Necessary with regard to Existence, but must have once begun to Be, or must have been created from Nothing by the more Perfect and Superior Substance,

Such

Such a Penetration farther appears ESSAY  
from the Nature of *Distance*. V.

According to the *Newtonian* Philosophy, that vast Space or Expansion in which the neighbouring great Bodies of the Universe move, is for the far greater Part, void of Matter. But as that Space is, the Foundation of the wide Distances between the mentioned Bodies, it cannot be deem'd a pure Nothing. For Bodies that have Nothing between them cannot but meet and coalesce or join together. Yet at the same Time, the mention'd Space or Expansion, though it be a Something sufficient to cause the Distances between those Bodies, is nevertheless no manner of Impediment to their Motions. But what surer Proof than this can there be of a Penetration of those Bodies by the Space or Expansion?

This All Penetrating Expansion is, I doubt not, a very great Reality, and far from resembling a Shadow against the Wall, as some vainly suggest. For a Shadow is only Darkeness or a mere Privation of Light, and has no real Dimensions distinct from those of the Wall itself. [m]uch less is it (as was observed) a pure Nothing or Creature  
of

ESSAY of Imagination. For certainly pure  
V. Nothing cannot have Dimensions, or  
be really measurable by Miles or Semidiameters of the Earth.

But if the Reality of an All-penetrating or most Perfect Expansion be so evidently demonstrable, it clearly follows, that it cannot be unworthy the Idea of the most Perfect of Beings; for as much as the most perfect Nature cannot but include whatever imports Reality and Perfection, in the most perfect possible Manner.

Lastly, Such a Penetration appears from the firm *Cohesion* of the Parts of some compound Bodies. Thus, when a Fluid Body becomes the Substance of a Plant or a Stone, its Particles, which were before in a manner loose from each other, become as it were cemented together. But by what Cement? 'Tis certain that the Figures of the minutest Particles still remain the same: And if the Cohesion and Union of divers of those Particles have form'd them into hooked Figures which take hold of each other, yet from whence proceed the Cohesion and Union of those minutest Particles? What was and is the Band of their Union? Was it (as the *Cartesians* suppose

suppose) nothing else but the mutual ESSAY  
Rest of those Particles which were V.  
before in Motion? But Rest has no  
more Virtue to unite, than Motion  
has to separate: And a very small  
Degree of Force is sufficient to move,  
and, by consequence, to separate such  
extremely minute Particles, tho' ne-  
ver so profoundly at Rest. How is it  
then that they cohere and unite so  
firmly as not to be separated without  
a very great Degree of Force? Is the  
Pressure of the external Air the Cause  
of it? This no Man will say: For  
then it would follow that all Bodies  
subject to an equal Pressure would be  
equally compact and hard; and like-  
wise that the same Bodies, when sub-  
ject to different Pressures of the Air,  
would be more or less hard: Which  
is contrary to Experience. It there-  
fore remains that this firm Cohesion  
and Union of the Particles of the Plant  
or Stone proceed from some internal  
Cause. But an internal Cause of Uni-  
on must be intimately present with  
every Part, and must, as it were, take  
hold of all the Particles that are uni-  
ted; which it cannot do without a  
Penetration of their Substance.

There



ESSAY There is therefore Something of a  
 V. Nature superiour to the Substance of  
 ~~~~~ Bodies that contains, penetrates, and,  
 as it were, possesses its very Nature :
 And this can be no other than the
 Substance of its Great Creator. For
 as for that Created Hylarchick Principle, or Spirit of Nature, spoken of
 by some Philosophers, 'tis reasonable
 to think 'tis purely Imaginary, because
 'tis absolutely Unnecessary.

3. Another Proof of the Certainty
 of such a Creation may be form'd
 from the *real Distinction and Plurality*
of Beings.

Spinoza, who held, That the entire
 Universe was full of Matter, and
 that One Individual Infinite Material
 Substance was *the ALL*, took away,
 by consequence, all real Distinction
 of Beings, and made every thing a
 Part of what he call'd the One Infinite
 Being. But if Distance or the
 Separation of the Parts of Matter by
 vast Vacuities, or Spaces void of
 Matter be sufficient to demonstrate a
 Distinction of Beings, we may rest
 assured (according to the *Newtonian*
 Principles) that the Planets and Fixed
 Stars are Beings really distinct from
 each other. And if Distance, join'd
 with

with a distinct Consciousness, be sufficient to prove the same Distinction, *Peter at Rome* cannot be the same Being with *Paul at London*. If therefore there is a real Distinction and Plurality of Beings, from whence may we suppose it to have sprung? Was there a Free or Arbitrary Cause, or was there a Necessary or Eternal Reason of it? A Necessary or Eternal Reason there could not be: For (as we have elsewhere * shewn) the Reason of Necessary or Eternal Existence is no less than Almighty Power join'd with all other possible Perfections; all which Perfections, being Uniform and capable of Coexisting in One and the same Being, could, by Consequence, be no Eternal or Necessary Reason of the Existence of more than One. It therefore undeniably follows, that Plurality of Beings was the Effect of a Free or Arbitrary Cause; i. e. the Result of Creative Power in an Eternal, Free and Almighty Being.

4. Another Proof may be derived from the *Immortal Nature of Humane Souls*.

Humane Souls, being no Compositions or Results of Compositions (as was shewn in the preceding *Essays*) and being therefore not naturally dis-

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sipable

* See Preface to *Christian Religion founded on Reason*:

ESSAY *fixable* or mortal, must either have
 V. been immediately created from No-
 thing, or else must have existed from
 Eternity. If they existed from Eter-
 nity, can it be supposed that none of
 us should have so much as a general
 Notion of our existing in a former
 State? Though our particular Ideas
 of external Objects appear to depend
 on the Brain, yet the Idea of Exist-
 ence, and even the general Ideas of
 Happiness or Unhappiness, (as was
 before observ'd) are fix'd in the Soul.
 If therefore our Souls were capable of
 Perception, even without the Brain
 or any bodily Organ from Eternity,
 how comes it that we have no Memo-
 ry of the State in which they existed,
 and perceiv'd from Eternity? If we
 cannot give a reasonable Account of
 this, 'tis reasonable to conclude, that
 our Souls did not exist from Eternity,
 but were created immediately from
 Nothing by the Supreme or Eternal
 Being.

5. The last Proof shall be taken
 from the Principles of our Adversar-
 ies themselves.

'Tis well known, that they suppose
 the Universal Matter or the whole Sy-
 stem of the Materials of which the
 Universe consists to be the only Sub-
 stance, and to be not only without a
 Free

Free Principle of Action, but even ESSAY
 purely Passive in each of its sup- V.
 posable Parts; and consequently, 
 they must allow that Motion is but a
 mere Passion communicated from one
 Part or Portion of Matter to another
 in a continual Circulation. From
 hence I argue thus: If Matter (or the
 Materials of which the Visible Uni-
 verse consists) was the Only Sub-
 stance and from Eternity, it was ei-
 ther at Rest from Eternity or in Mo-
 tion. If *at Rest*, it could never have
 begun to move without a Free Prin-
 ciple of Action; which is what our
 Adversaries are by no means inclin'd
 to allow it. If *in Motion*, then it can
 never cease to move. For if Motion
 was an eternal Attribute or Affection
 of Matter, it was and is an absolutely
 Necessary Attribute of Matter. But
 to say, that Passive Matter (as they
 themselves suppose it to be) ever had,
 and still has an absolutely Necessary
 Connection with Motion, is to con-
 found the Ideas and Natures of Things.
 For Passiveness includes no more in its
 Idea or Nature than a Capacity of be-
 ing either moved or at Rest indiffe-
 rently: Since what is entirely Passive
 is absolutely indifferent either to Mo-
 tion or Rest. But what was indiffe-
 rent to both, could have no Connec-

ESSAY tion with either. If therefore Mat-
 V. ter was neither at Rest nor in Motion
 (according to their own Principles)
 from Eternity, it was not from Eter-
 nity, but began to Be, or was creat-
 ed by the Eternal Being.

S E C T. IV.

But Justice requires that we should
 consider the Objections that have been
 made.

Obj. 1. One great Objection against
 the Creation of a new Substance is ta-
 ken from our Incapacity to form an
 Idea of the Manner of it.

But this Objection must needs va-
 nish when we reflect that tho' an Ex-
 istence without Cause and Beginning is
 the most demonstrable Thing in Na-
 ture, (for Something must have been E-
 ternally or without Beginning) yet we
 are at least, as incapable of forming an
 Idea of an Existence without Beginning
 as of an Existence with Beginning.

Several other Instances of the De-
 ficiency of our Ideas might be pro-
 duced. A Man born blind hath all
 the Reason in the World to believe
 there is such a Thing as Sight, tho'
 for Want of Ideas he cannot conceive
 the Manner of it. And we all know
 that our Bodies are moved, tho' no
 Man can conceive by what Sort of
 Power

Power, and in what Manner the Motion is begun. These Instances clearly demonstrate that our Ideas or Conceptions, being sometimes deficient, are not always the Standards of the Truth of Things, and consequently, that it is very unreasonable to disbelieve a Thing of which we have sufficient rational Evidence, purely because we can form no Idea of the Manner of it. ESSAY
V.

Obj. 2. The *Spinofists* insist much upon it, That no Substance can create or produce any Thing which hath not formally or properly in itself whatever Attributes or Properties it is said to communicate to Others. Thus, say they, that which is entirely Impotent or Unintelligent cannot produce or communicate Power or Intelligence: And by Parity of Reason, that Being which hath no Proper Extension (or Amplitude at least) could not communicate Extension and Solidity to Matter.

I answer. 'Tis hard to conceive why any Man should make it a Difficulty to allow that the Creator of all things possesses all the Real Attributes which he communicated to Other Beings, as far as they imply Perfection. Who can deny that the Eternal Being hath the most Perfect Self-Motion, as he

ESSAY he is most Perfectly Self-active? But

V! Internal Motion or Self-motion (tho' without Change of Place, which proceeds from Imperfection) might very well communicate Motion to the Visible Universe. And who can deny that His Substance is the most solid as well as the most Extensive, which is not only Impenetrable by any other, but which penetrates and contains all other Substance, being itself Unbounded by any thing? These Queries being duly consider'd, it will appear that this is no such formidable Objection as it seem'd to be.

Obj. 3. 'Tis further objected, that since the most Perfect Being could not fail to act in the most Perfect Manner, therefore it follows, that whatever He effected, both could not but Be, and could not be otherwise than it was: From whence it seems likewise to follow, that the Material Universe was Necessary or Eternal.

I answer. 'Tis confess'd that the most Perfect Being, in case he acted, could not but act in the most perfect Manner. Therefore He acted not Eternally or Necessarily with Regard to other Beings, but most Freely; because Freedom or Liberty of Action with Regard to other Beings, is a Perfection, and the Contrary would be

be a great Imperfection, as implying a Necessary Dependence on other Beings. But since the Most Perfect Being could not depend on any other Being, therefore, (contrary to the Inference made in the Objection) the Material Universe was not Necessary or Eternal.

ESSAY
V.
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*Obj. 4.* Again, the *Spinosists* argue thus. The most Perfect and Happy Being could Will nothing but Himself. For to suppose him to Will or Produce any Being, is to suppose what is inconsistent with the very Nature of Perfect Happiness; forasmuch as it is to suppose Him to want an Addition to His Happiness which was ever most Perfect.

I answer. The most Perfect Being could not but be naturally qualified for and disposed to Beneficence, as far as was consistent with the Perfection of Liberty. But His Acts of Beneficence, as they must be supposed to have been Free, so they must be supposed to have been exerted with a Direct View to the Happiness of Others, not with the least Reflex View to the Increase of His own Happiness, which could not but be ever most Perfect. Therefore the most Perfect and most Happy Being might Will Something besides Himself.

*Obj.*



ESSAY *Obj.* 5. In the last Place, 'tis objected; That to suppose that an Absolutely Infinite Being produced any other Being, is to suppose a Number beyond, or exceeding, an Absolutely Infinite Number: Which is Absurd or Contradictory.

I answer. This Argument for ought appears, may conclude against those who suppose the Nature of the Supreme Perfection to include an Absolute Infinity of Kinds and Degrees. For, on that Supposition, the Creation of any Real Kind or Degree of Perfection in a distinct Being, would, perhaps, be like reckoning beyond an Absolutely Infinite Number. But that Notion of the Supreme Perfection, as it seems to be ill-grounded and infinitely confused, so it has been, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, the Occasion of many other Errors besides those of *Spinoza*. But of this more has been said elsewhere. \*

\* See, *The Impartial Enquiry into the Existence and Nature of God*, Book II.

F I N I S.

